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 LIST OF BASIC NOTATION 
 
D   Deterministic rate of market demand (units/year); 
Q   Retailer’s order quantity (units); 
  n = Number of delivery batches per production run; a positive integer;  
  k = Proportion of shortage resulting from the supplier’s yield loss that is fulfilled by   
  emergency procurement from an external supplier; 
pQ   Supplier’s production lot size, Qp = nQ (units); 
bp   Retail price charged by the retailer (dollars per unit); 
vp Wholesale price charged by the supplier to the retailer (dollars per unit); 
p  Production cost for the supplier (dollars per unit); 
0p Emergency procurement price from an external source (dollars per unit); 
cb = Ordering cost incurred by the retailer ($/order); 
 cv = Setup cost incurred by the supplier ($/setup); 
 hb = Inventory holding cost for the retailer ($ unit/year); 
 hv = Inventory holding cost for the supplier ($ unit/year);  
  β = Proportion of market demand satisfied at the retail level; 
  𝑟 = Proportion of defects produced at the manufacturing stage of the supplier (yield loss); 
g, g0 = parameters of a linear penalty function for incurring shortages, i.e. the y-intercept 
and the slope, respectively, of a linear shortage cost function; 
𝛱𝑏= annual profit of the retailer; 
𝛱𝑣= annual profit of the supplier; 
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𝛱𝑐ℎ= annual profit of the entire supply chain system. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to develop analytical models for typical 
supply chain situations to help supply chain decision-makers under supply yield loss. We 
derive solution procedures for each model and present several managerial insights obtained 
from our models through numerical examples. Additionally, this research provides 
decision-makers insights on how to incorporate uncertainty in demand and supply and 
shortage information into a mathematical model. 
This study deals with three forms of integrated cost-profit models under different 
scenarios including coordination policy and supply yield loss in a two-stage supply chain 
involving a retailer and a supplier, dealing with a single product under deterministic 
condition. We compare the profits of the whole supply chain system under the coordinated 
policy with those of individual decision making approaches and demonstrate the efficiency 
of coordination.  These models attempts to find the optimal solutions for the retailer’s 
order quantity, quality level, amount of emergency procurement, and the production and 
shipment decisions of the supplier, so that the resulting joint total profit for the entire 
supply chain is maximized. We illustrate our model and the potential benefits of 
outsourcing in a supply chain system through a numerical example. 
9 
 
Extending the analyses obtained above, we then develop models for an integrated 
supplier–retailer supply chain under imperfect production and shortages, with the 
additional decision variable of market pricing on the part of the retailer. We assume that 
market demand is sensitive to the retailer’s selling price and study the combined operation 
and pricing decisions in the supply chain. We develop profit maximization models for the 
cases of independent and joint optimization. The results of obtained from our analyses 
demonstrate that the individual profit, as well as joint profit can be increased by our 
suggested model, under a non-linear price dependent demand function. In addition, the 
results with retailer-supplier coordination tend to be superior, which leads to illustrate that 
setting appropriately retailer’s selling price can increase market demand and the profits of 
both parties, as well as that of the supply chain. 
Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate these models, and the 
sensitivity analyses of a selected set of model parameters on the total profit is conducted. A 
major finding of this study is that coordination between the retailer and the supplier 
improves channel profit significantly.  Furthermore, the possibility of external procurement 
tends to improve total system profitability as the price sensitivity of demand increases.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Motivation  
Most companies face quality challenges in their products or services, since quality 
improvement has been one of the long-term competitive strategies for performance 
enhancement. Improving quality has been considered an important factor in achieving 
competitive advantages over business rivals, and is attended to extensively in today's fast-
paced and increasingly competitive market (Tellis and Johnson, 2007). Over the past 
decades, increasing product recalls reveals that manufacturing firms are particularly 
vulnerable to product quality and safety, especially when goods and materials are  sourced 
globally. The number of recall cases in EU countries due to quality problems has doubled 
during the period 2005-2010 (RAPEX, 2011). The impact of poor quality can be seen 
across various industries. Even highly reputable companies well-known for excellent past 
quality performance cannot be immune from the impact of a major recall. See for the 
examples. The cases involving Toyota (Kumar and Schmiz, 2011), the food industry in 
China, and even low-technology toy manufacturing in China (Tse and Tan, 2011). Such of 
substandard output seriously hurt the reputations and the brands of the companies 
involved, thus, affecting their bottom-line conditions adversely. 
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Recent product recalls also suggest that manufacturing firms are particularly 
vulnerable to product defects where goods and materials have been sourced via a supply 
chain with poor visibility, i.e. lack of information on the material origins and the quality of 
suppliers (Tse and Tan, 2011). The rapid increase in product quality incidents in global 
supply chains brings not only new challenges to the policy makers, but also gives rise to 
new research issues and opportunities for the academic world, especially in the field of 
supply chain management. Thus, quality-related research in supply chains provides 
opportunities for new explorations towards extending existing theories and application 
frameworks.  
Supply chains and networks have increased significantly in complexity due to the 
involvement of numerous suppliers, service providers, and end customers (Pfohl et al. 
2010). Recent industry trends in the business world have forced companies to expand their 
activities into new regions in search of qualified employees, lower production costs, high 
availability of raw materials, giving rise to wider and more complex supply chains while 
creating new opportunities for the enhancement of competitive advantages. As customer 
expectations go up, better quality products with shorter delivery times, more customized 
products, and extremely high service levels become essential for survival in a highly 
competitive market place. In addition, such a fierce market competition in the global 
economy has driven companies in many industries to look for better strategies and methods 
in optimizing their business processes and practices via a higher levels of coordination, 
collaboration, and integration within supply chains. (Arshinder et al, 2008) This situation 
also boosts competition between manufacturing firms, which inspires them to work out 
new strategies and practices towards achieving a better match between their production 
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policies and market demands. This continuously evolving dynamic poses interesting 
challenges for effective coordination, collaboration, and integration of supply chains. 
These changes require the implementation of new organizational models with 
different suppliers and partners responsible for an important part of final product delivery, 
yielding a service of excellence for satisfying customers. In order to increase value and 
enhance profitability, it is fundamental to establish successful partnerships with the supply 
chain partners that can be achieved via new models of cooperation, improved 
communication and integration among all the relevant constitutions. The utilization of 
advanced management practices is essential to accomplish these objectives. In this context, 
the use of integrated approaches to quality, logistics and supply chain management 
becomes fundamental. Therefore, it will be important to take advantage of quality 
management and supply chain management synergies in order to improve customer 
satisfaction, increase employee motivation and to improve the performance of the 
organization. 
A supply chain consists of numerous stages involved, either directly or indirectly, 
in fulfilling customer requests. Such a chain includes manufacturers, suppliers, 
transporters, warehouses, retailers, third-party logistic providers, and customers. The 
objective of supply chain management is to maximize the overall value generated rather 
than profit generated in a particular stage (Chopra et al, 2007). Throughout the 1980's and 
1990's the concept of customer and supplier integrative relationships have attracted 
renewed attention from researchers, as well as practitioners. Business in general has begun 
to develop close relationships with selected clients, sometimes termed strategic customers, 
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and significantly more emphasis has been placed on improving working arrangements with 
critical suppliers.  
Supply chain collaboration has been strongly advocated by both industry and 
academics since the mid 1990's, under the banner of concepts such as Supplier Managed 
Inventory (VMI) and Collaborative Forecasting Planning and Replenishment (CPFR). It is 
widely accepted that creating a seamless, synchronized supply chain leads to increased 
responsiveness and lower inventory costs. The driver behind such collaboration is the 
desire to extend the control and coordination of operations across the entire supply process, 
replacing both market and vertical integration as means of managing the flow process 
(Larsen, 2003).  
According to Chopra et al (2007), the definition of integration is “the quality of the 
state of collaboration that exists among departments that are required to achieve unity of 
effort by the demands of the environment”. While this definition refers to integration 
internal to a firm or organization, our emphasis here goes beyond the firm and 
encompasses external entities that are major players in a supply chain.  
Supply chain coordination (or channel coordination) aims at improving supply 
chain performance by aligning the plans and the objectives of individual enterprises. It 
usually focuses on inventory management and replenishment decisions in distributed inter-
company settings. These strategies which were recently developed in supply chain 
management offer the potential for not just cutting cost but also generating new revenues 
and higher profits. The remaining challenge is to link those novel approaches together to 
garner the competitive advantage of a seamless flow throughout the supply chain.  
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With these supply chain strategies, one of the key decisions that a company has to 
make while designing a product and producing it involves setting the level of quality of its 
output. Broadly speaking, “quality" refers to an attribute (or a combination of attributes) 
more emphasis on which increases the selling price of a product but also its marginal cost. 
A number of existing papers address this basic question and its variants in different 
contexts (Jeuland 1983). However, this literature has largely overlooked issues arising 
from operational considerations. 
Quality has been defined as fitness for use, or the extent to which a product 
successfully serves the purpose of consumers (Juran et al., 1974). Akerlof’s (1970) work 
“The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and market mechanism”, was a pioneering 
work introducing the term “quality uncertainty”. It explained; due to prevailing asymmetry 
of information, how the “lemons”, synonym for bad cars, drives the good cars out of the 
market. A phenomenon of “market for lemons”, originally used to explain the resale 
market, must have equal capabilities in analyzing the primary sales market and is deemed 
exploratory research. Acceptance of a quality product (service) is largely influenced by 
informational rubric at the market end and hence theories of information economics need 
to be coalesced in a quality paradigm. One side of the market is better informed than the 
other, and results in poor selection. Low quality products penetrate the market at the cost 
of high quality products. Informational asymmetric customers may perceive the product 
price as an average of low and high, which subsumes the cost of manufacturing of high 
quality product ensuing in quality uncertainty. 
 Some studies define the integration of quality in supply chain management as the 
concept of Supply Chain Quality Management – SCQM (Lin and Gibson, 2011). From this 
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point of view, designing a supply chain can be recognized as providing quality products 
and services across every organization or stage in the supply chain, to clients’ expectations. 
Robinson and Malhotra (2005) stated that  
 
“SCQM is the formal coordination and integration of business processes involving  
all partner organization in the supply channel to measure, analyze and continually  
improve products, services, and processes in order to create value and achieve  
satisfaction of intermediate and final customers in the marketplace.” 
 
SCQM assumes a methodical and integrative approach to managing the operations and 
relationships among different parties in supply chains, in other words, it integrates all 
parties along the value chain into one whole organism and manages them as the assets of a 
wide entity (Simchi-Levi et al., 2000; Mentzer et al., 2001; Kannan and Tan, 2005; Wang 
et al., 2004). 
Improving the quality of all supply chain processes leads to overall cost reduction, 
improved resource utilization and improved process efficiency (Wang et al., 2004). There 
are some studies that investigate how quality management can be used to improve the 
performance of the entire supply chain (Lin and Gibson, 2011; Dowlatshahi, 2011; Flynn 
and Flynn, 2005; Fynes et al. 2005). Other studies that identify various theoretical and 
methodological characteristics of the ways in which knowledge management applications 
are proposed in the supply chain context (Robinson and Malhotra, 2005). However, there 
still are some issues that remains unexplored (Yeung, 2008; Forker et al., 1997). Some 
authors suggest that further research is needed to provide a clearer understanding of quality 
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practices along the supply chain and the association between quality practices and a 
system’s overall performance (Marra et al., 2012; Kim, 2007; Cao and Zhang, 2011; 
Craighead et al., 2009; Bozarth et al., 2009). For example, Terziovski and Hermel (2011) 
present an exploratory study about the role of quality management practices in the 
performance of integrated supply chains, concluding, similarly as do Robinson and 
Malhotra (2005) that traditional quality management programs should be transformed, so 
that quality initiatives interact and synchronize across the entire network of firms in the 
supply chain. In this study, Terziovsky and Hermel propose that future research should 
focus on why quality practices are strong predictors of an integrated supply chain, and that 
future work on integrated quality and supply chain management need to empirically 
examine the aforementioned research questions using different methods such as survey and 
case study approaches with multinational samples. 
Lin et al. (2005) concludes that key quality management practices can be integrated 
into the supplier participation programs to provide needed collaboration, which in turn 
would result in improved organizational performance and also that such performance can 
be optimized when the organization considers its suppliers as important trading partners 
and members of the value chain. They state that more research is needed to extend their 
conclusions to other countries or regions. 
Kannan and Tan (2005) have empirically examined the extent to which just in time 
(JIT), Supply Chain Management (SCM) and Quality Management (QM) are correlated, 
and consequently their impact on business performance. Their study demonstrates that at 
both strategic and operational levels, linkages exist between how these areas are viewed by 
organizations as a part of their operations strategy. Their results indicate that a 
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commitment to quality and an understanding of supply chain dynamics have the greatest 
effect on performance. Their empirical study, although interesting, is like others studies, 
limited in scope, in terms of all the supply chain and quality practices. 
In view of the existing research, we can say that the integration between SCM and 
QM is a natural process, since, traditionally, the emphasis of supply chain is on specific 
functions such as purchasing, manufacturing and shipping in order to support logistics 
operations. In a competitive environment, there is a need to improve performance by 
controlling costs, increasing efficiency and service levels, rapid response and high quality 
of products and services (Lin et al., 2005). 
It is clear that our understanding of how the areas of QM and SCM are related in a 
particular organization and their impact on organizational performance are still very 
limited (Ramos et al., 2007; Agus, 2011). Flynn and Flynn (2005) show that organizations 
that pursue both quality and supply chain goals are likely to achieve a competitive 
advantage. Nevertheless, other researchers found mixed results of the effect of quality 
management practice on supply chain performance, suggesting that more research is 
required in order to provide some guidance to both researchers and supply chain managers 
on how to distribute resources to issues that are critical for the integration of quality 
management to improve supply chain performance. Some studies have attempted to 
ascertain the impact, affect in a limited fashion, of these issues on system perfoemance 
(Fynes et al., 2005; Flynn and Flynn, 2005; Min and Mentzer, 2000; Forker et al., 1997; 
Yeung, 2008). 
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1.2 Scope of Dissertation and Research Objectives 
SCM applies a methodical and integrative approach to managing the operations and 
relationships among different parties in supply chains. In other words, SCM integrates all 
parties along the value chain into one whole organism and manages them as the assets of a 
wider entity (Simchi-Levi et al., 2000, Mentzer et al., 2001; Kannan and Tan, 2005; Wang 
et al., 2004). 
There exists a substantial volume of literature on supply chain collaboration, 
integration, and coordination since Pasternack (1985) first proposed the notion of optimal 
pricing and return policies for perishable items. When suppliers are the sources of quality 
problems, prior literature has focused on sustaining a retailer’s competitiveness given 
strong assumptions on production capacity, product quality, quality inspection, and 
delivery policy. Most of the extent work is based on the critical assumption of perfect 
product quality. This assumption is, however, often questionable in the real issues, such as 
in supply yield loss. Surprisingly, the literature has not paid sufficient attention to quality 
uncertainty from a coordination perspective. On the other hand, the literature on channel 
coordination has not considered quality problem in designing supply chain partnerships. 
We bridge the gap between these two streams of literature by explicitly considering yield 
loss in a coordination framework.  
Another deficiency in the current literature pertains to information asymmetry on 
quality issues. Information asymmetry usually occurs in a supply chain when some entities 
in the chain are better informed than others. Despite recent advances in information 
technology and the trend towards sharing information among business partners, 
information asymmetry remains a key feature of real supply relationships. Since the 
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entities in a supply chain may belong to different firms that have conflicting objectives, 
they may not have access to private information, a system-wide optimal solution may not 
be implementable unless it can fully resolve any incentive alignment problems caused by 
asymmetric information in the system. This observation provides another important 
motivation for this dissertation in which we will develop optimal supply chain contract 
structure via exploring the impact of the information asymmetry on price and quality 
issues.  
For simplicity, we combine our attention to a retailer-supplier relationship involving a 
single product under deterministic condition. Our goal is to develop integrated individual 
as well as joint optimization coordinated models that consider supplier’s yield loss and 
information asymmetry.  In order to achieve these goals, we attempt to  
• generalize existing channel coordination mechanisms in the form of yield loss with 
the objective of profit maximization and the possibility of an emergency procurement 
option from an external vendor. 
• analyze optimal supply contract design mechanisms under supply yield loss, 
 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we briefly present the ongoing trends in 
supply chain management, point out why scientific research is crucial to support the 
advance of new approaches towards the existing problems in supply chain management, 
and highlight some challenges for mathematics, operations research, and economics. In 
order to develop supply chain coordination model and contract design framework that 
considers cost-profit structure, information asymmetry, and issues; this dissertation 
investigates the following two sets of areas. 
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1.2.1 Supply Chain Coordination and Optimization under Y with an option for 
Emergency Procurement from an External Vendor 
Supply yield loss often hampers the ability to satisfy all market demand for any reason, it 
causes a serious problem. Under this stockout situation, retailers will lose their loyal 
customers, sales, reputation, and so on. One of the strategies for the supplier to overcome 
this situation may be to procure the item from an external source and then to supply it back 
to its customers as quickly as possible. In the marketing perspective in today’s business 
environment, as for the retailer, it is naturally desirable for the supplier to implement 
complete outsourcing to hold the customers without considering the costs to make up for 
shortage as quickly as possible. However, the supplier may consider the trade-off between 
the total costs and the benefits related with emergency supply. Thus, this dilemma makes it 
inevitable that optimal decisions for external procurement by aligning the business 
processes and coordinating all the activities of the channel participants for the purpose of 
improving both the performance of the individual party and the total profits of the entire 
supply chain. Specifically, the supplier needs to adjust the ratio of external procurement to 
self-production based on the outsource price and the penalty cost for capacity shortage to 
reach an optimal solution. 
Therefore, motivated by Goyal (1976, 1996), and Sinha and Sarmah (2007), we 
propose a new scheme using the supply chain coordination models and a framework of 
supply chain contract design under quality uncertainty in a two-stage supply chain. In this 
dissertation, we investigate the following problems in this area: 
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• Formulating supply chain coordination models under quality uncertainty, which 
maximize the total profit of the supply chain, 
• Developing a supply chain coordination model which determines the optimal ratio of 
external procurement. 
 
1.2.2 Supply Chain Optimization and Coordination under Quality Uncertainty with Non-
linear Price Sensitive Demand   
The classical objective of logistics is to be able to have the right products in the 
right quantity, at the right place, at the right moment at minimal cost. Efforts to produce an 
efficient supply chain are centered on managing logistical flow and inventory. In 
overcoming many of the new challenges of the comprehensive enterprise, the coordination 
of members along the supply chain is vital. Without coordination a supply chain system 
cannot be optimal as a whole since each party will only try to enhance his own profits. 
That is why to ensure the optimal system and to satisfy customer demands in today’s 
competitive markets, significant information needs to be shared along the supply chain. 
Moreover, a high level of coordination between the supplier and retailer’s decision making 
is also required. The concept of Joint Economic Lot Sizing (JELS) is introduced to filter 
traditional methods for independent inventory control and to find a more profitable joint 
production and inventory policy.  
Based on the previous works by Sinha and Sarmah (2007), and Sarmah et al (2006) 
and we propose a new supply chain coordination model with non-linear price sensitive 
demand   under quality uncertainty in a two-stage supply chain. In this section, we examine 
the following issues in this area: 
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• Formulating supply chain coordination models with non-linear price sensitive 
demand under quality uncertainty, which maximize the total profit of the supply chain, 
• Developing supply chain coordination strategies which determines the optimal 
ranges of the retail price, and the external procurement price under quality uncertainty and 
non-linear price sensitive demand. 
 
1.3 Research Contributions 
The supply chain coordination and optimization models in this dissertation address the 
need to incorporate quality uncertainty into the strategic planning process. In particular, we 
contribute to the literature on supply chain coordination and optimization model as 
follows: 
 
 We develop a supply chain coordination model to determine the optimal ratio of 
emergency procurement from an external supplier in case of stockouts due to quality 
uncertainty. We examined all possible scenarios for supply chain optimization and 
coordination in a two-stage supply chain through non-coordinated approach, suppler-
driven, retailer-driven, and jointly coordination. This model can also be extended to 
model supplier selection problem or dual sourcing according to the performances of 
the external suppliers. We present a heuristic algorithm using nonlinear mixed integer 
programming for this model. 
 
 We extend the first model by relaxing constraints and assumptions under a new 
scenario. We present a joint manufacturer-retailer production-inventory-marketing 
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model for a defective product by a uniform distribution. The contribution of the 
research to the joint economic lot sizing literature is to incorporate the pricing 
policy as well as the imperfect quality into the previous joint manufacturer-retailer 
models. Our review of the literature showed that joint economic lot size models 
have frequently been studied in the past, and that the production of defective items 
and pricing decision have also been studied in this stream of research. It also 
became apparent, however, that imperfect production, planned shortages and 
pricing have not yet been studied in combination in the context of a JELS model, 
and that the interdependencies between these decision problems are therefore not 
yet well understood. This study establishes a link between the literature on 
shipment, ordering, pricing policies, imperfect quality and the joint economic lot-
sizing literature. The second article makes a contribution to close this research gap 
by developing a joint economic lot size model that analyzes these problems 
simultaneously. 
 
 We develop a supply chain coordination model and contract design framework that 
considers cost-profit structure, information asymmetry, and quality uncertainty issues 
in supply chains. We sought to provide implementable contractual arrangements to 
coordinate the channel with the consideration of supply uncertainty. We first develop 
a general framework that incorporates supply uncertainty. Based on the general 
framework, we further develop supply contracts under conditions of supply 
uncertainty and deterministic demand with an infinite planning horizon. 
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1.4 Outline of the Dissertation 
After providing a survey of literature related with supply chain coordination under 
quality uncertainty, we have divided the dissertation into three detailed parts.  
In the next chapter 2, we review and synthesize the extant literature in the supply 
chain coordination and competition, which help demonstrate the importance of our 
research and how our work will fit in with current academic interest and recent trends in 
supply chain practice. Chapter 3 examines a two-stage supply chain coordination model 
under quality uncertainty under shortage. A stochastic supply chain optimization model 
under quality uncertainty is addressed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we study supply chain 
contracts under quality uncertainty with information asymmetry considerations. The 
conclusion and the future directions of the dissertation are summarized in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A supply chain or supply network in a real business world is extremely complex 
and involves numerous entities in a network, how to coordinate a decentralized supply 
chain has long been a key issue in supply chain management. With the development of 
information technology, information sharing mechanism could restructure the supply chain 
by coordinating decision-making and integrating supply chain activities through supply 
chain contracts. There have been various studies on business strategies and mathematical 
models on supply chain coordination through contracts and competition among supply 
chain members, and there are still growing interests of research in both. 
However, only a limited number of research papers have analyzed this intra-chain 
dynamics of supply chain coordination and competition under quality uncertainty, which is 
one of the important motivations of the dissertation. Therefore, we must carry out our 
investigation from the ground level. Fortunately, substantial work has been done on supply 
coordination, integration, and competition in inventory theory, and we will review that 
relevant literature in the next section. Literature related to (1) inventory models with 
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imperfect quality items, (2) supply/demand uncertainty in supply chains, and (3) supply 
chain coordination under quality uncertainty, and (4) supply chain contract design for 
quality improvement were reviewed and summarized in this chapter. The main focus of the 
literature was on the supply chain optimization and coordination, revenue management, 
and decision making in outsourcing.  
In production planning, when there is a dynamic demand in any production period, 
this demand must be satisfied by one or more of the following strategies: (1) production; 
(2) inventory; (3) back logging; (4) outsourcing; and (5) sale loss. Note that there are 
limits, respectively, on production, inventory, backlogging, outsourcing, and sale loss 
levels. Furthermore, five kinds of costs must be taken into account: production cost 
(including setup cost), holding cost, backlogging cost, outsourcing cost, and sale loss cost. 
There are two kinds of capacity limits: (1) production capacity and (2) inventory capacity.  
With the objective of minimizing the total cost aggregated from the five kinds of 
costs over the definite time horizon, in literature, the following four families of models are 
proposed, corresponding to the five strategies mentioned before. 
 
 Models without backlogging: Each demand must be entirely delivered by 
production and/or inventory; 
 Models with backlogging: Each demand must be satisfied by production and/or 
inventory from previous periods and/or from subsequent periods; 
 Lost sale models: There are two kinds of lost sale models, stockout models and 
conservation models. In stockout models, the demand does not have to be entirely 
met in all periods. Unmet demands mean revenue lost or penalty cost; 
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 Outsourcing models: Each demand must be satisfied by production and/or 
inventory from previous periods and/or outsourcing. 
 
In order to discuss interactions between quality and inventory, it is first necessary to 
understand each component separately. The use of quality techniques in manufacturing is 
not new; the American Society for Quality Control (ASQC) was already established in 
1946 (Montgomery, 1991). There has been extensive research in the area of quality as a 
separate entity. (See Kolesar (1993) and Ebrahampour (1993) for thorough reviews on 
quality management).  
The interactions of quality and inventory are not independent and flow in both 
directions. One way to gain improvement in the area of lot sizing is to address quality 
improvements first. Decreasing lot size can also lead to increased quality. Another theme 
in the quality and inventory relationship is that of systems such as Just-in-Time, Japanese 
manufacturing, and World Class Manufacturing. In addition, themes such as productivity, 
learning, equipment, maintenance, and others are linked to or by quality and inventory in 
the current research. 
Many of the relationships between quality and inventory are modeled with 
optimization methods. Yano and Lee (1995) reviewed some of these works, but did not 
necessarily relate random yields to quality. Many of the optimization models in our work 
challenge or provide alternatives to the classical economic order quantity (EOQ) models 
when quality-related challenges exist for the production process. 
We view the taxonomy in relation to the violation of some model assumptions, 
which include: Constant and continuous demand; no imposition of constraints; 
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instantaneous replacement; maintenance or inspection; time constant costs; shortages; and 
imperfect quality. All of the optimization models we review here assume that some level of 
defectives will occur.  
 
2.2 Deterministic two-stage supply chain coordination and optimization under 
quality uncertainty 
The issue of coordination in supply chain management (SCM) has received 
considerable attention from academic researchers and practitioners. Traditionally, both 
suppliers and retailers in the supply chain system make decisions in search of their 
individual benefits. However, many researchers (e.g. Parlar, et al, 1997; Qin, et al, 2007; 
Sarmah, et al, 2006; Weng, et al, 1997, etc.) have pointed out that coordination between 
both parties is important in order to gain competitive advantages through cost reduction. 
The importance of coordination is further increased because suppliers and retailers 
frequently implement the just-in-time (JIT) concept in their own systems. 
A recent study pointed out that coordination is crucial to successful JIT 
implementation for both parties (Huang, 2004). A key technique in successful SCM is JIT 
application to multiple deliveries. Chung and Wee (2007) showed that increases in quality, 
productivity, and efficiency can be achieved through JIT delivery agreements. A recent 
study showed that if a long-term relationship has been established, both parties in the 
supply chain system can achieve further improved benefits through cooperation and 
information sharing (Chang, et al, 2006). Rau and OuYang (2008) presented a new 
integrated production-inventory policy that showed that the performance of integrated 
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consideration is better than the performance of any independent decision from either the 
retailer or the supplier.  
Goyal (1976) was among the first researchers focusing on the joint economic lot 
size (JELS) problem in the supply chain system, in which an integrated inventory model 
was developed assuming the supplier’s production rate was infinite. Banerjee (1986) 
generalized Goyal’s model so that the supplier produced to the retailer’s order on a lot-for-
lot shipment policy. Later, Goyal (1988) relaxed the lot-for-lot shipment assumption and 
proposed a more general JELS model that provided a lower-joint total relevant cost, in 
which he suggested that the supplier’s economic production quantity (EPQ) should be an 
integer multiple of the retailer’s purchase quantity. Landeros and Lyth (1989) generalized 
these models by incorporating the fixed shipment cost associated with each delivery to the 
retailer.  
Recently, Goyal (1995) and Hill (1997) proposed different shipment policies and 
suggested that each shipment size should be determined by the first shipment size and rate 
of production/demand. As shown by Viswanathan (1988), neither a policy with equal-sized 
sub-batches nor a policy with unequal-sized sub-batches dominated the other. Ertogral et 
al. (2007) further analyzed the supplier-retailer lot-sizing problem under equal size 
shipment policy, in which they incorporated transportation costs explicitly into the model 
and developed optimal solution procedures for solving the integrated models.  
More recently, Ben-Daya et al. (2008) presented a comprehensive and up-to-date 
review of the joint economic lot sizing problem and also provided some extensions of this 
important problem. To simplify analysis, many researchers discuss the supply chain system 
with a single-supplier and single-retailer. A globally optimal batching and shipment policy 
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for a two-echelon supply chain with single-supplier and single-retailer was established by 
Hill (1999), in which he pointed out that the successive shipment size of the first m 
shipments using a fixed factor. Hoque and Goyal (2006) suggested an optimal procedure 
for a single-supplier and single-retailer production-inventory problem with equal-sized and 
unequal-sized shipments, in which a transportation equipment capacity constraint was 
included. Further, Huang (2004) developed an optimal policy for a single-supplier and 
single-retailer integrated production-inventory problem with process unreliability 
consideration. More recently, Chen and Kang (2010) developed integrated supplier-retailer 
cooperative inventory models with the permissible delay in payments to determine the 
optimal replenishment time interval and replenishment frequency. 
 
Inventory models with imperfect quality items 
In practice it quite often occurs that inventory management is affected by imperfect 
product quality. Porteus (1986) integrated the effect of imperfect items into the basic EOQ 
model, in which he used the simple model to illustrate the relationship between quality and 
lot size. Rosenblatt and Lee (1986) assumed that defective items could be reworked 
instantly at a cost and they found that the presence of defective products motivated smaller 
lot sizes. Later, Schwaller (1988) assumed that defective items were present in incoming 
lots and the inspection costs should be incurred in finding and removing such items. An 
EOQ-based model with demand-dependent unit production cost and imperfect production 
processes was proposed by Gerchak (1992), in which he formulated the inventory decision 
problem as a geometric program that was solved to obtain optimal solutions. Salameh and 
Jaber (2000) also developed an EOQ-based model for items received with imperfect 
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quality, in which they assumed that the defective quantities could be sold as a single batch 
by the end of 100% screening process. They found that the economic lot size increased as 
the average percentage of flawed quality items increased. Goyal and Cardenas-Baeeon 
(2002) proposed a simple method for deter mining the EPQ for an item with imperfect 
quality.  
Recently, Huang (2004) developed a model to determine an optimal integrated 
supplier-retailer inventory policy for imperfect items in JIT environment. Papachristos and 
Konstantaras (2006) focused on the issue of no shortages in EOQ-based models with 
proportional flawed quality, in which the proportion of the imperfects was assumed to be a 
random variable. More recently, Wee et al. (2007) developed an optimal inventory model 
for items with imperfect quality and shortage backordering in which the optimum 
operating inventory strategy was obtained by trading off the total revenues per unit time. 
Furthermore, Maddah and Jaber (2008) developed an EOQ-based model with unreliable 
supply, characterized by a random fraction of imperfect quality items and a screening 
process. They rectified a flaw developed by Salameh and Jaber (2000). 
Recent operations management literature began to focus on developing integrated 
models that can simultaneously optimize the relevant inventory (operations) and pricing 
(marketing) decisions (Sajadieh, et al, 2009). A literature reviews on pricing and ordering 
policies for manufacturer–retailer supply chains was made by Khouja (1999). In the 
meantime, Petruzzi and Dada (1999) also made a review with extensions on pricing and 
the news supplier problem. Mantrala and Raman (1999) further investigated the effect of 
the retailer’s optimal ordering quantity decisions under demand uncertainty. Lau and Lau 
(2002) developed a joint pricing–inventory model and they found that different demand 
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functions could lead to very different results in a multi-echelon system. Later, 
Viswanathan and Wang (2003) developed a simple supplier-retailer supply chain model in 
which the retailer faces a price-sensitive deterministic demand.  
Ray et al. (2005) further introduced an integrated marketing inventory model for 
two pricing policies in which they considered price as a decision variable using mark-up 
pricing. More recently, Bakal et al. (2008) presented two inventory models with price-
sensitive demand and they investigated two different pricing strategies. Pan et al. (2002) 
further constructed a two-period model to discuss pricing and ordering problems for a 
dominant retailer under a two-echelon supply chain. 
A detailed survey of the recent inventory models with imperfect items are provided 
by Khan and Guiffrida (2011). Roy et al. (2011) developed an EOQ model for imperfect 
items where a portion of demand were partially backlogged. Combining the effect of 
product deterioration, imperfect quality, permissible delay and inflation with the 
EOQ/EPQ model, Jaggi et al. (2011) investigated an inventory model when demand is a 
function of selling price. Yu et al. (2012) extended Salameh and Jaber (2000) when a 
portion of the defectives can be utilized as perfect quality and the utilization of the 
acceptable defective part will affect the consumption of the remaining perfect quality items 
in the stock. In another model, Jaber et al. (2013) investigated Economic Order Quantity 
(EOQ) model for imperfect quality items under the push-and-pull effect of purchase and 
repair option, when the option when defectives are repaired at some cost or it is replaced 
by good items at some higher cost. They presented two mathematical models; one for each 
case and discussed optimal policies for each case. 
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More recently, Liu et al. (2013) studied effect of substitution when two loss averse 
retailers are competing for substitutable product under stochastic demand rate and 
deterministic substitution rate. They have developed game theoretic model obtained unique 
optimal policy for Nash equilibrium under certain conditions. In addition, Salameh et al. 
(2014) have solved joint economic lot size model with substitution and observed that 
substitution is highly beneficial in saving cost.  
 
Supply-driven chain vs. Demand-driven chain 
Supply chain management has actively stimulated much academic interests on both supply 
and demand chains. However, most of these studies in the literature focused on demand-
driven supply chain. Supply-driven chain’s production is different from traditional 
demand-driven production because its supplies must guide the full production flow toward 
the markets and respond actively to customer demand. 
Sethi & Sethi (2001) defined this demand-driven supply chain as marketing-driven 
supply chain and Ayers (2006) described it as forecast-driven supply chain. These chains 
exist in personal computers, automobile and electronics production areas where customer 
demand propagates through supply chain and manufactures attempt to make best use of its 
resource to meet the demand while subject to production capacity limitation.  
Based on the product and market demand characteristics, Fisher (1997) classified 
these chains into physical efficient and market responsive. The former produces basic 
functional products with stable demand where emphasis is on efficiency while the latter 
produces innovative products with fluctuating demand where the emphasis is on marketing 
responsiveness.  
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A review of some of models and solution approaches on supply chain and 
production planning was given by Mula et al. (2006). There is, however, another category 
of supply chain existing in diverse areas such as crude oil, fruit, agriculture, flower, water 
resource, energy production, mail and packaging processing etc. is dramatically different 
from a demand-driven chain. Bullow & Shapiro (2003) studied the supply chain of 
Alaskan and Canadian oil production, and Hameri & Palsson (2003) studied the supply-
driven chain in the fishing industry. Wang et al. (2004) discussed a product-driven chain 
whose operation relied more on product capacity rather than demand. 
Paulsen & Hensel (2007) introduced a supply-driven chain in water and energy 
production and discussed its different characteristics. Schultmann et al. (2006) built a 
supply planning model driven by reverse logistics for remanufacturing system, which can 
be taken as a kind of supply-driven chain driven by reverse supply. Hull (2005) reviewed 
supply-driven chain characteristics and provided a summary of these applications. Due to 
either economic characteristic, product perishability and the nature of being a co-product, 
or administration considerations, these chains are activated by supply, rather than customer 
demand, exhibiting different characteristics, and requiring different supply coordination 
and production planning mechanisms from demand driven chains.  
 
Inventory models with emergency procurement option 
As for the emergency procurement option in supply chain, in literatures, Khouja (1996) 
solves a newsboy problem with an emergency supply option. Barnes-Schuster et al. (2002) 
illustrate how options provide flexibility to a retailer to respond to market changes in the 
second period using a two-period model with correlated demand. Babich (2006) presents 
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valuation of inventory-reorder options in a competitive environment with imperfect 
production system and studies the value of the deferment option. Xu and Nozick (2009) 
study the use of option contracts for global supply chain design. Xu (2010) studies the 
situation that the manufacturer may purchase option contracts from the supplier before the 
demand is realized, or order after the demand is realized, which is subject to random 
pricing and uncertain availability. Xia, et al. (2010) study two contract mechanisms to 
share risks in a decentralized supply chain: the option contract and the firm order contract. 
Compared with the sourcing modes in the existing literatures, the single sourcing with 
emergency option mode can combine the cost advantage of single sourcing mode and the 
risk dispersion advantage of buying emergency option, and is of greater application value.  
 
2.3 Stochastic Two-Stage Supply Chain Coordination and Optimization Model under 
Quality Uncertainty 
Today in dynamic market conditions, the supply chain coordination is becoming a 
key factor. In traditional supply chain management, the production, inventory, and 
shipment policies of supply chain members are managed separately. Therefore, the optimal 
lot size for one member may not result in an optimal policy for the others. In literature, the 
integrated manufacturer-retailer model has been addressed, where the joint total profit for 
both the retailer and the manufacturer is maximized. 
The integration between supply chain members has long been debated as reviewed 
in the previous section. Goyal (1976), initiated the concept of a joint optimization problem 
of supplier and retailer, on the assumption that the supplier has an infinite production rate. 
Banerjee (1986), extended the joint economic lot size (JELS) model in which the 
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manufacturer was obliged to order under the lot-for-lot policy. Goyal (1988), relaxed the 
assumption of lot-for-lot, and assumed that the production lot is shipped in a number of 
equal-size shipments. Goyal (1995), proposed a model where by the shipment size is raised 
by a factor equal to the ratio of the production rate to the demand rate.  
In supply chain coordination field, over recent years, researchers have investigated 
multi-supplier and retailer. Recently, Glock and Kim (2015) investigated a single supplier–
multi-retailer supply chain and considered the case where the supplier merged with one of 
its retailers. Sajadieh and Thorstenson (2014) studied a supply chain with a single retailer 
and either one or two supplier(s)/supplier(s). In addition, some researchers investigated 
multiple suppliers. Sajadieh et al. (2013) studied an integrated production–inventory model 
for a three stage supply chain involving multiple suppliers, multiple manufacturers and 
multiple retailers. 
In contrast, perfect-quality products are avoided in some studies; hence, the process 
may deteriorate and produce defective products. Porteus (1986), Lee and Rosenblatt 
(1986), probed the effect of defective products on the basic Economic Order Quantity 
(EOQ). Numerous researchers have expanded miscellaneous imperfect quality inventory 
models for this critical problem involving an imperfect production process (e.g., Schwaller 
1988; Zhang and Gerchak 1990; Cheng 1991; Ben-Daya and Hariga 2000; Salameh and 
Jaber 2000; Cardenas-Barron 2009; J.T Hsu and L.F. Hsu (2013)). 
Yang and Wee (2000) investigated a joint inventory model for supplier-retailer 
under an imperfect production process. Another study in this area was published by Goyal 
et al. (2003), who introduced a simple approach to find an optimal integrated supplier–
retailer inventory policy for a defective product. Hardik and Kamlesh (2014) investigated a 
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single-supplier-single-retailer production inventory model involving defective items in 
both an individual and joint management system with service level constraint. Hsu and 
Hsu (2012) probed an integrated inventory model for supplier-retailer under the conditions 
of defective products, where the supplier inspects the products. Recently, Hsu and Hsu 
(2012) designed a model to frame an integrated supplier retailer inventory policy for 
defective products, where the retailer inspects the products.  
Relaxation of the basic EOQ and EPQ models’ assumption that stockouts are not 
permitted led to the development of models for the two basic cases for stockouts – 
backorders and lost sales. The work of Salameh and Jaber (2000) was the first model that 
provided an economic order quantity for a retailer who receives imperfect lots. They 
extended the traditional EOQ model by accounting for imperfect quality items with 
deterministic demand and instantaneous replenishment. Goyal and Cardenas-Barron (2002) 
presented a simpler EOQ/EPQ model for imperfect items and an easier approach to 
implement lot size calculation with defective rate to the model of Salameh and Jaber 
(2000). Konstantaras et al. (2007) extended the model in Salameh and Jaber (2000) along 
two dimensions. First, they assumed that the acceptable items are entered into work-in-
process inventory in batches and not on unit-by-unit basis. Second, items that were defect 
free after completing rework were used to meet the demand. Chan et al. (2003) integrated 
lower pricing, rework and reject situations into a single economic production quantity 
(EPQ) model. It was assumed that rework items can be kept in stock at a cost.  
Another issue in the lot sizing area that has attracted the attention of numerous 
researchers is the integration of production and pricing. One of the first models of this kind 
was formulated by Kunreuther and Richard (1971), who incorporated pricing into the 
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traditional EOQ model considering a linear price. Reyniers (2001) later developed a model 
of single-manufacturer, single-retailer distribution channel, in which the retailer faces a 
price sensitive deterministic demand, on the assumption that the manufacturer has a finite 
production rate. A multitude of researchers have developed a joint inventory model for 
manufacturer-retailer, where market demand is a function of price (e.g., Viswanathan and 
Wang 2003; Ray et al. 2005; Bakal et al. 2008, Wang et al 2015). Sajadieh and Jokar 
(2009) proposed the supplier–retailer supply chain lot sizing models where market demand 
is a linear function of price, assuming that the production lot is shipped in a number of 
equal-size shipments. Kim et al. (2011) probed an integrated inventory model for 
manufacturer-retailer under the conditions of price dependent demand. The retailer places 
orders based on the EOQ model, and the manufacturer produces the ordered quantity on a 
lot-for-lot basis. Readers are referred to Sajadieh and Jokar (2008) and Glock (2012), and 
Ben-Daya et al. (2008), for reviews of the JELS models.  
In this research, the four aforementioned literature branches are integrated in a 
model where the shipment, ordering, pricing policies, imperfect quality and backordering 
are optimized all together. In real world cases, the manufacturers usually accept the return 
products and sell them in the second market. That is our motivation to do this research. 
Incorporating these two features into the model increases the complexity. The study 
investigates an approach to adopt an optimal joint manufacturer-retailer inventory policy 
for a product with imperfect quality. In this model, market demand is a linear function of 
price. Shortages are allowed and assumed to be completely backordered. The authors have 
analysed how the coordination between two supply chain members is affected by the 
number of defective products with a uniform distribution while the end-customer demand 
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is price sensitive in the first market. The models for the two-level supply chain were 
extracted from the non-joint and the joint policies. 
 
2.4 Supply Chain Contract Design for Quality Improvement 
Supply chain members coordinate each other by using contracts for better management of 
business relationship and risk management. Tsay et al. (1999) provide a good taxonomy 
based on contract clauses. In their work, supply contracts are classified into eight 
categories: specification of decision rights, pricing, minimum purchase commitments, 
quantity flexibility, buyback or returns policies, allocation rules, lead time, and quality. 
Because several novel works on supply contracts, such as price protection, revenue-
sharing, etc., have appeared in the last few years, the various extensions of supply chain 
contracts have been proposed by researchers. 
Contractual agreements between suppliers and retailers in relation to inventory 
management are also heavily studied with emphasis on the cost of the (decentralized) 
equilibrium solution as compared to the centralized optimal; see Lariviere and Porteus 
(2001) for wholesale price contracts, Pasternack (1985) for buy-back contracts, Tsay 
(1999) for quantity-flexibility contracts, Taylor (2002) for sales-rebate contracts, Bernstein 
and Federgruen (2005) for price-discount contracts, etc. Lariviere (1998) and Cachon 
(2003) surveyed related results. Our study differs from this huge body of literature in that 
these studies relate to inventory management decisions and represent production capacity 
in aggregate units, whereas we address product quality issues and the optimal ratio of 
outsourcing which are one of the essential decisions in an outsourcing setting. 
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In supply contract design, when a retailer places an order and a supplier deliver them, 
the issues of who controls what decisions and how entities will be compensated are critical. 
Due to the importance of supply contracts, the field has developed in many directions. We 
narrow our search to the articles which explicitly offer the analysis of the relationship 
between the suppliers and retailers in supply chain management area.  
In the literature review, we also focus on the one-supplier-one-retailer structure, rather 
than including multiple-retailer and multiple-supplier structures. Since the work on supply 
chain contract design based on the one-supplier-one-retailer structure is ample and more in 
depth, which provides an insightful understanding of intra-chain dynamics under exciting 
contractual arrangements.  The research on multiple-retailer and multiple-supplier 
structures, on the other hand, is relatively scarce and rarely offers optimal policies. 
In buyback contract, the retailer is allowed to return the unsold inventory to some 
fixed amount at agreed upon prices. The manufacturers accept the returns from the retailers 
when the production costs are sufficiently low and demand uncertainty is not too great 
(Padmanabhan and Png, 1997).  
Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) and Cachon and Lariviere ( 2002, 2005) study 
revenue-sharing contracts in a supply chain with revenues determined by each retailer’s 
purchase quantity and/or price. They demonstrate that revenue-sharing coordinates a 
supply chain with a single retailer. Also, they find that a number of other supply chain 
contracts (e.g., returns policy, quantity discount, quantity-flexibility, rebate) do not 
effectively coordinate all of the supply chains that they consider. However, they 
acknowledge several limitations of revenue-sharing contracts. Revenue sharing does not 
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coordinate competing retailers when each retailer’s revenue depends on its order quantity 
and the vector of the retail price.  
Even though traditional inventory theory generally assumes that the retailer can order 
any quantity from the supplier at any time, in the quantity flexibility contracts, the supplier 
and the retailer accepts some of the inventory and stock out cost burden. The supplier 
allows the retailer to change the quantity ordered after observing actual demand. The 
retailer commits to a minimum purchase and the supplier guarantees a maximum coverage 
(Tsay, 1999). Lee et al. (1997) described these contracts as a response to certain supply 
chain inefficiencies. The coordination achieved by the contracts provides incentives to all 
supply chain members and improves the service level.  
There are a number of extensions to buyback contracts and quantity flexibility 
contracts are presented in the literature like two period supply contract model for 
decentralized assembly system (Zou et al., 2008), flexible returns policies in three-level SC 
(Ding and Chen, 2008) to fully coordinate SC members, option based flexibility contract 
(Bassok and Anupindi, 2002), and time-inflexible contract (Li and Kouvelis, 1999). 
As for information asymmetry issues in supply chains, Corbett and Groote (2000) 
derive an optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information about the 
retailer’s holding costs. Corbett and Tang (1999) analyze three types of contracts from the 
supplier’s point of view with information asymmetry considerations about the retailer’s 
cost structure. Also, they point out that more flexible contracts allow the supplier to trade 
with retailers with higher costs. Ha (2001) considers designing a contract to maximize the 
supplier’s profit in the newsboy problem when demand is stochastic and price-sensitive 
and the supplier has incomplete information on the marginal costs of the retailer. He shows 
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that the supplier’s profit is lower than in the complete information case while the retailer’s 
is improved. 
Finally, in the area of the supplier’s quality commitment, Reyniers and Tapiero (1995) 
use a simple game-theoretic formulation of a supplier-producer channel to examine the 
impact of the contract structure on the supplier’s quality and the producer’s inspection 
practices as well as its implications for the quality of the end product. Since suppliers often 
have more information about the quality of the parts than the producer, Lim (2001) 
investigates contract design when there is incomplete information regarding the quality of 
the parts. He shows that when the supplier and the producer have to share damage costs, an 
optimal contract is one where the supplier compensates the producer by the same amount, 
regardless of his quality type. However, a supplier with low quality is more likely to be 
offered a contract with an inspection scheme, while a supplier with high quality is likely to 
be constrained with a warranty scheme. Finally, we seek to extend the current literature by 
exploring the impact of the information asymmetry on price and quality. In this 
dissertation, we explore it on designing contracts in a two-stage supply chain with a single-
product where the product is shipped from a supplier to a retailer at a wholesale price and 
then sold to a price-sensitive market.  
 
2.5 Research Gaps 
Observations and Gaps in Uncertainty and Supply Chain Coordination in literature are 
listed as below:  
• Most of the studies are restricted to two level serial supply chains. In reality, supply 
chain can have divergent and convergent multi-echelon structures and managers may 
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consider other options or additional resources to handle the issues in their supply 
chains. The literature seems lacking to address the uncertainty concerns in such 
structures. 
• A limitation of the existing literature is that most of the work on supply chain 
coordination has been connected to decisions related to ordering quantity, and 
inventory reviewing policies with the optimal reorder point and reorder quantity. The 
above mentioned models are also limited to analyze only the issues of coordination 
on individual pay-offs rather than making efforts towards investigating the impact of 
competition on the coordination of the whole supply channel. 
• The literature has emphasized more on demand uncertainty, whereas, supply 
uncertainty can be of equal concern in the era of globalization and outsourcing. 
Moreover, optimization-based quantitative models can be proposed to explore the 
impact of supply uncertainty on supply chain performance. 
• Concept of product quality risk in supply chains has not been fully investigated in 
literature. Although Zsidisin (2003) stated that quality risk includes the risk of 
producing unsafe or unreliable products that can even harm the consumer, when 
these defects are caused by another firm or inherited from a sub-contractor or an 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM). However, neither product quality risk nor 
its domino effect in a serial supply chain have been thoroughly studied.  
• As to production quality, there are also two kinds of supply chain production models, 
namely perfect quality model and imperfect quality model. Most models in 
references above are built on the basis of perfect quality. In supply chain production 
practice, however, imperfect quality or defect is very common and the process may 
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deteriorate and produce defective or poor quality items. It can impact the production 
system (Radhoui et al. 2009). For example, defects can be attributed to internal 
production quality issues or external unqualified supply, the Chinese milk melamine 
scandal in 2008 (Chan, 2008) and Mattel’s toys with lead manufactured in China 
(Tse and Tan, 2011) are typical examples of these cases. Recently, supply chain 
quality management gains attentions and may form a new direction (Batson & 
Mcgough, 2007). 
• The literature on quality uncertainty is limited by its exclusion of a coordination 
perspective in the supply chain. On the other hand, the coordination literature is 
limited by its exclusion of quality uncertainty in designing a contract of alliance for 
the entire supply chain. There is a scope to explore combination of supply chain 
contracts to deal with product quality risk in case of either overproduction or 
underproduction. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INTEGRATED AND COORDINATED MODELS UNDER YIELD 
LOSS WITH EMERGENCY PROCUREMENT OPTION 
 
  
3.1 Introduction 
In today’s global market, companies pay more attention to supply chain 
management and they realize that the performance of their businesses depends largely on 
collaboration, coordination, and integration across the supply chain.  Increased competition 
on cost, quality and flexibility, profit maximization in a globalized area has compelled the 
researchers and the practitioners to consider the entire supply chain from material supplier 
through manufacturer to distributor as a single business process. So in order to maximize 
the profits, firms in supply chain may both compete and co-operate with each other.  
Supply chain management has been increasingly discussed in academia and 
industry since the mid-1980s. Managing inventory in a two-stage supply chain involves 
minimization of inventory across each member while simultaneously meeting the customer 
service goals. Each stage of a supply chain thrives to improve its operations, reduce costs 
and increase profitability through coordination. A coordination mechanism may be 
necessary to motivate the members to achieve coordination. Supply chain members are 
dependent on each other and these members need to be coordinated by efficiently 
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managing dependencies between each other. The concept of coordination may guide 
supply chain participants to work coherently to identify interdependencies between each 
other, to mutually define goals and to fairly share risks and rewards. Hence the 
consideration of joint optimization of supply chain is of interest. 
The two-stage supply chain model depicts the dynamics of a retailer and a supplier: 
A retailer as a retailer purchases items from one main supplier and resells them at retail 
price for a single selling season while a supplier manufactures products and sells them to 
the retailer a whole sale price. Recently the cooperation between supplier and retailer for 
improving the performance of a supply chain has received a great deal of attention from 
researchers, and supply chains with multiple decision makers have begun to receive 
considerable interest due to the fact that independent entities in the supply chain acting in 
their own self-interest often make decisions that are sub-optimal. In such cases, a 
centralized control is supposed. In fact, a decentralized control of the supply chain is more 
appropriate. In a decentralized supply chain, there may be several decision makers 
pursuing different objectives and one party may be dominant over the other to achieve his 
own goal. 
In the literature, the researchers and practitioners have considered the problem of 
coordinating a two-stage supply chain with a retailer and a supplier. Moreover, a lot of 
them only addressed channel coordination in supply chain paying less attention to the 
issues of product quality risk and supply chain coordination with emergency procurement 
option under shortage and stochastic demand.  
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a cost-profit relationship model in a two-
stage supply chain where the supplier has insufficient production capacity to the retailer 
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because of product quality risk and the demand of retailer is independent stochastic 
variable. In a two-stage supply chain, first the retailer places an order at its own optimal lot 
size to the supplier and the supplier produces the retailer’s order quantity. Because of 
unexpected insufficient production capacity and product quality risk, the supplier may fail 
to meet the market demand. A lost-sale may occur for the supplier in case of a shortage to 
the retailer and then the supplier is subjected to a stock-out cost for the lost sales. In this 
situation, the supplier has an option for emergency procurement to avoid the stock-out by 
coordinating with the supply chain members together. 
 In this chapter, we give an introductory discussion on the two types of supplier-
retailer coordination model studied in this dissertation: an integrated coordination model in 
which the supplier and retailer can fully cooperate with each other in making decisions to 
maximize the total system profit, and a channel coordination model in which one party 
provides a certain coordination scheme to entice the other one to make decisions in a 
cooperative way that increases the individual profit for both parties. In addition, we also 
discuss a benchmark model, referred to as the individual decision model, in which there is 
no coordination between the supplier and retailer. For each model, we give the profit-
maximizing formulation and the optimal properties of individual and system profits. We 
also introduce the practice in which the corresponding coordination mechanism could be 
meaningful. These discussion and observations are then used to support the studies on the 
specified supply chain coordination issues.  
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In this research, we apply the concept of optimal outsourcing and partial 
backlogging into a deterministic inventory model. The penalty cost is regarded as a 
constant in Sinha et al (2007) recently. However, the warranty cost is characterized as a 
function of the level of either backorder or external procurement in many real situations.  
Table 3.1 summarizes differences between Sinha et al (2007) and our proposed model. 
Our proposed model extends the basic two stage supply chain coordination problem to 
consider the feature of optimal outsourcing under quality risk when a stock-out occurs. 
The supplier fulfils the remaining customer demand at an optimal ratio of emergency 
procurement from an external supplier, even though some amount of remaining customer 
demand becomes lost sales as we minimize the total operational costs. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces some assumptions and 
notations. An individual decision model of supplier and retailer are proposed in Section 3.3 
and three different types of supply chain coordination models are proposed in Section 3.4. 
 Sinha et al.(2007) Proposed Model 
Model 1. Individual Decision Model 
2. Retailer/Retailer’s Perspective  
    Coordination Model 
1. Individual Decision Model 
2. Manufacturer/Seller’s  
    Perspective Coordination Model 
3. Retailer/Retailer’s Perspective  
    Coordination Model 
4. Integrated Joint Coordination Model 
Penalty Function for 
Shortage 
1. Constant 1. Constant 
2. Linear function of k 
Decision variables n,  Q,   k (binary, either 0 or 1) n,  Q,   k (continuous, 0 ≤ k* ≤ 1) 
Total profit function Πch[n, Q, k] Πch[n, Q, k] 
Revenue Sharing 
Mechanism 
None 
Revenue sharing contract 
by channel performance 
Table 3.1 Differences between Sinha et al.(2007) and the proposed model 
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A numerical example and applications are discussed in Section 3.4 and 3.5. Summary and 
concluding remarks are provided in Section 3.6.  
 
3.2 Assumptions 
We consider a simple supply chain problem with a single manufacturer/seller and a single 
retailer/retailer. Figure 3.1 illustrates the inventory patterns of both retailer/retailer and the 
supplier/supplier. The retailer has an annual demand rate of D units for the given product, 
and places regular orders of fixed size Q. The supplier manufactures a production lot Qp = 
nQ  by producing items in batches of size Q and planning to have each batch delivered to 
the retailer in n shipments, each with a lot of Q units. The supplier fulfills the shipments of 
Q units immediately. Since the production process on the manufacturer’s plant is not 
perfect, some of the Q units may be defective at the rate of r. Thus the maximum inventory 
level of the retailer is  1 r Q . We also assume that the production capacity of the 
supplier is limited for some other reasons, the annual market demand D is partially 
satisfied, which means that the fraction of the annual demand ( D ) is provided by the 
supplier. Once the retailer receives the lot of Q units, a 100% screening process is 
conducted on the retailer’s side. The retailer satisfies all demand with good quality items 
and we assume the retailer disposes of all defective items at no costs instead of returning 
them to the supplier. We assume that shortages at the retailer are allowed and the supplier 
has an option for emergency procurement from an external supplier. The following 
assumptions are used in our model. 
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Assumptions 
1. The annual demand is known, and constant 
2. The defective items at the percentage of r exist in lot size Q. 
3. A 100% screening process of the lot is conducted at the retailer’s place and there is 
no inspection error. A defective item incurs a warranty cost for the supplier. 
 
Figure 3.1 Inventory pattern of retailer and supplier 
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4. Shortages are allowed. 
5. There is a single manufacturer/supplier and a single retailer/retailer in a supply 
chain. 
6. The inventory holding cost per unit of the retailer (hb) greater than that of the 
supplier (hv). 
7. Both the retailer and the supplier share complete information. 
8. The planning horizon is infinite. 
9. The replenishment is instantaneous. 
 
3.3 Model Formulation 
 In this chapter we formulate two-stage supply chain coordination models when the 
supplier has inefficient production capacity and has an option for emergency procurement. 
We consider four types of two stage supply chain models.  
 Firstly, we formulate an individual decision model. In this independent model, 
manufacturing and ordering policies are independent and coordination between the 
supplier and the retailer will not be considered. Secondly, we consider an individual model 
from supplier’s point of view. This model is opposite to the retailer's point of view model. 
Because supplier is a decision-maker, the warehouse and retailer decide ordering policies 
according to the supplier's decision. For instance, the high-technology products are made 
by the supplier's decision regardless of the warehouse and retailer's order. Because the 
supplier and retailer’s inventory policies can be described by simple economic order 
quantity (EOQ), we can easily derive the optimal policies. Thirdly, we develop an 
individual model from retailer’s point of view. In this model, the retailer is a decision-
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maker. Therefore, the other parties follow the retailer's ordering policy. For example, 
department stores decide the ordering policies regardless of the other parties, because they 
have a power in the marketplace.  Finally, we formulate an integrated joint coordination 
model. The supplier and the retailer fully cooperate with each other to make decisions that 
maximize the system profit. The assumption of full cooperation usually makes sense in the 
practice of supplier-managed inventory (VMI) system, where the supplier, usually a 
manufacturer but sometimes a distributor, is authorized to manage the inventory levels at 
the retailer. 
 
3.3.1 Non-coordinated Decision Model 
In this section we consider an individual decision model in a two-stage supply 
chain, we assume there is no coordination between a supplier and a retailer, which may 
represent any two upstream-downstream participants that are independently managed. In 
this model, the supplier and the retailer do not cooperate with each other to make decisions 
to maximize the system profit. Each participant makes its own decision to maximize its 
individual profit. In this section we consider two cases when supplier dominates supply 
chain decisions and when retailer has a channel power and drives market decisions. 
In this situation, the supplier may face stock-outs when it can’t satisfy the market 
demand because of his/her insufficient production capacity or for any reason. We consider 
that both the retailer and the supplier have their own policies individually to maximize 
their net profits. The supplier annually provides only βD units, and the retailer has to 
modify his order so that he/she can fit the supplier insufficient production capacity. The 
retailer places the order at its own optimal lot size Q∗ units to the supplier and the supplier 
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produces n times the retailer’s order quantity (Q*) to optimize the production set-up 
number. It is assumed that manufacturer’s inventory is multiples of retailers ordering 
quantity and it can be written as  1Q r  in its imperfect production process. We assume 
the percentage of the annual demand satisfied by the supplier, β is defined  
(1 )
1 (1 ),
r D krD
r k if Supply Demand
D

 
      
When the supplier fails to supply sufficient products to the retailer in a supply 
chain, it finally leads to a lost-sale, and the supplier is subject to a penalty cost per unit per 
year for the lost sales. 
 
 
3.3.1.1 Retailer driven model 
In a retailer’s perspective model, we assume that the retailer has the greater channel power 
to initiate the replenishment decision to maximize its individual profit. The supplier needs 
to make decisions subject to the retailer’s optimal decisions. 
A general retailer driven model can be expressed as follows: 
 
Retailer Driven Model 
Retailer’s problem 
Max. Retailer’s Profit 
   s.t.  Supplier’s constraints 
 
Supplier’s problem 
Max. Supplier’s Profit 
   s.t. Retailer’s optimal decisions 
         Supplier’s constraints 
 
 
 A retailer driven model consists of two sub-problems and can be solved in 
sequence. First the retailer makes decisions to maximize its individual profit in the 
retailer’s own problem, which means that the retailer makes decisions on *Q  and 
*n for the 
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supplier and the supplier adjusts its policy according to them. The retailer’s optimal 
decisions, in turn, become one constraint in the supplier’s problem, whose objective is to 
maximize the supplier’s profit through making decisions on manufacturing, replenishment, 
supply etc. Thus we can obtain the profit functions of the retailer and supplier as below 
 
From Eq. (3.1), the retailer’s individual optimal lot size Q* is obtained as follows 
 
Accordingly, the retailer’s individual optimal profit is given by 
 
From Eq. (3.15), corresponding to the lot size that the retailer determined, the supplier’s 
profit function can be obtained as follows: 
b  = Gross revenue – Purchasing cost – Ordering cost – Holding cost  
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From Eq. (3.17), the optimal number of delivery batches per production run, *n  of 
the supply chain system is expressed as follows: 
 
Thus, the total profit function of the supply chain system is given by 
* *( , )v n Q  
= Gross revenue – Purchasing cost – Production Cost – Procurement Cost – 
Setup cost – Holding cost – Penalty Cost for Shortage   
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From Eq. (3.19), by taking the first derivative of the total profit function of the supply 
chain system, we can obtain the solution of the optimal sourcing problem as follows 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1.2 Supplier driven model 
In a supplier’s perspective coordination model, the supplier has the greater channel power 
and makes decisions (e.g. supply, replenishment, manufacturing, etc.) independently to 
maximize its individual profit. Consequently, the retailer has to make decisions (e.g. 
replenishment, selling, etc.) subject to the supplier’s optimal decisions. The retailer adjusts 
its policy according to the supplier’s decisions on 
*n  and *Q . The assumption of the 
supplier driven model usually makes sense in the situations where the supplier and retailer 
are two independent departments (or facilities) in the same company. For instance, the 
supplier may represent a warehouse owned by the logistics department and the retailer may 
represent a retail outlet owned by the marketing department.  
A general supplier driven model can be expressed as follows: 
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Supplier Driven Model 
Supplier’s problem 
Max. Supplier’s Profit 
   s.t.  Supplier’s constraints 
 
Retailer’s problem 
Max. Retailer’s Profit 
   s.t. Supplier’s optimal decisions 
         Retailer’s constraints 
 
 
A supplier’s perspective model consists of two sub-problems and can be solved in 
sequence. First, the supplier’s problem aims to make the optimal decisions (e.g. 
manufacturing, replenishment, supply, etc.) for the manufacturer/supplier to maximize its 
individual profit. The retailer’s problem, in turn, aims to make the optimal decisions (e.g. 
replenishment and selling price, etc.) for the retailer to maximize its individual profit, 
subject to the retailer’s optimal decisions obtained in the supplier’s problem. 
 In this model the supplier determines this lot size *Q  by taking the first derivative 
of the supplier’s profit function with respect to Q and finds an optimal 
*n  corresponding 
to Q* to maximize its individual profit v . The supplier’s individual profit function can 
be expressed as follows. 
From Eq. (3.8), the supplier’s individual optimal lot size Q* is obtained as follows: 
v  = Gross revenue – Production Cost – Emergency Procurement Cost – Setup 
cost – Holding cost – Penalty Cost for Shortage   
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In a similar way, from Eq. (3.8), the supplier can derive the number of the shipments per 
batch production run, 
*n  as follows 
Corresponding to the supplier’s decision, the retailer accept its decisions on Q* and n*. 
The total profit function of the supplier’s perspective coordination system with lost sales is 
obtained as follows: 
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From Eq. (3.12), by taking the first derivative of the total profit function of the supply 
chain system, we can obtain the solution of the optimization problem as follows 
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3.3.2 Joint Coordination model 
When shortage occurs, the administrative cost increases and retailer has to loose sales to 
their customers. In this situation, the retailer often abandons suppliers who can’t deliver the 
product and turn to other suppliers and sometimes other brands. Any shortage usually leads 
to a lost sale even interrupt the supply chain channel as a whole. In order to attract retailers 
and keep the supply chain going normally, both the supplier and retailer must take 
decisions jointly and the supplier decides to go for outsourcing to recover lost sales 
completely or partially. So we suppose that k is the fraction of the demand shortfall that 
may be recovered by outsourcing or external procurement, we can easily obtain the profit 
functions of the retailer and supplier for each model. 
In an integrated joint coordination model the manufacturer/supplier and 
retailer/retailer fully cooperate with each other to make decisions that maximize the system 
profit. The assumption of full cooperation usually makes sense in the practice of supplier-
managed inventory (VMI) system, where the supplier, usually a manufacturer but 
sometimes a distributor, is authorized to manage the inventory levels at the retailer. The 
manufacturer /supplier can use this information to plan production, schedule deliveries, 
and manage inventory levels at the retailer. As a consequence, system cost will likely be 
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reduced while capacity utilization will be increased. A general joint coordination model 
can be expressed as follows. 
 
Joint Coordination Model 
Max.  Total System Profit of both supplier and retailer. 
s.t.      Retailer’s constraints 
           Supplier’s constraints 
 
First, the total profit function of the supply chain system can be obtained by 
Since both the supplier’s and the retailer/retailer fully cooperate with each other to make 
decisions that minimize the total costs and maximize the system profit, 
 they can make coordinated decisions on *Q and 
*n . From Eq. (3.20), the optimal lot size 
*Q of the entire supply chain system is obtained as follows: 
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From Eq. (3.20), in a similar way the optimal number of delivery batches per production 
run, *n  of the supply chain system is expressed as follows 
*
*
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From Eq. (3.20), by taking the first derivative of the total profit function of the supply 
chain system with respect to k, we can obtain the solution of the optimization problem as 
follows: 
 
So far we have derived the net profit functions and the optimal policies of each supply 
chain model. For the proposed individual and coordinated models in this chapter, the 
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results of individual optimization and coordinated decision are summarized in the Table 
3.2. 
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 Individual Decision  
Model 
Supplier Driven Model Retailer Driven Model Joint Coordination Model 
Emergency 
Procurement 
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Table 3.2 Summary of optimal policies 
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3.4 Solution Procedure 
 The ultimate objective of the proposed models in this chapter is to find the optimal 
ratio of emergency procurement, the optimal order quantity, and the minimum number of 
shipment such that the total joint profit of the supply chain system is maximized. These 
nonlinear optimization problems are to be solved for * *,n Q  and 
*k . To solve this non-
linear optimization model, we modify the iterative algorithm proposed by Shinha and 
Sarmah (2007).  
 
3.4.1 Heuristic algorithm for optimal solution 
We first consider *n to be constant and find out the values of *Q and 
*k . Then we 
go for selecting a wide range of possible values of *n and compute the values of the 
objective function. Finally, we select the best solution in a direct search method. From 
Proposition 1, it is apparently clear that for fixed *Q and 
*k , the profit function is concave. 
Hence, the search for option solution, *n , is reduced to find the local optimal solution. In 
other words, for given n, the maximum values will occur at the point which satisfies the 
optimal conditions simultaneously. 
 
Algorithm 
Step 1, Set n = 1,  
0Q  = 0, 0 0k  . 
Step 2, For each j = 0, 1, 2... , perform the following procedures: 
2-1) For individual decision model and supplier driven model,  
i) calculate jQ  for the given jn  from Table 3.2  
ii) for given Qj and jn , compute accordingly jk  from Table 3.2 
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2-2) For supplier driven model and joint coordination model,  
i) for given jn , compute jQ  and jk  simultaneously by running a nonlinear 
mixed integer model from Eq. (3.23).  
Step 5, If 
* * *( , , ) ( , , )MaxJ N N N J N N Nn Q k n Q k  , go to Step 6, otherwise, ( , , )
N N N
J k Q n is 
the optimal solution with maximum point. Repeat steps (1) – (5) with n = 2 to n = n* 
(where n* = the highest integer value of n) until finding (П*ch) max = f (k*,Q*,n*). 
Step 5, Increase n by 1 and go to step 2.  
 
Following the above-mentioned procedures, the maximum system profit can be derived in 
these three cases, where, (i) emergency supply option is available ( *k  ≠ 0), (ii) emergency 
procurement is not possible ( *k = 0), and complete outsourcing ( *k = 1) for a given unit 
external procurement price 
0p . (See the Table 3.3.) We see that 
*k  is highly related with 
*Q  in retailer’s perspective model and joint coordination model. In addition, in both the 
individual decision model and the supplier’s perspective coordination model, change in *k  
does not affect *Q .  
 From Table 3.3., if we take the highest value of k possible for a corresponding 
optimal value of Q and the possible maximum of k  = 1, then the maximum system profit 
will be obtained. Thus, it is found that for a particular value of n and Q, as long as 
0 0*(1
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)
[ bb
c
p p g g
Q r
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
 , system profit increases with increasing k  and reaches the 
maximum value when the ratio of external procurement reaches the optimal value *.k  On 
the other hand, if 0 0*(1
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)
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c
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Q r
  

 , it is better not to choose the emergency 
68 
 
procurement option. The underlying mechanism is to manipulate lot size Q in such a way 
that the overall system cost is decreased and the savings can be utilized to go for 
outsourcing even at a higher price till a particular limiting value. The underlying 
mechanism is with consideration of all cost factors which includes inventory holding cost, 
ordering cost, transportation cost, etc. to optimize the lot size Q and the savings of the 
whole system can be utilized for the emergency supply option until the emergency 
procurement price goes up to a particular price much higher than the retail price. In the 
solution procedure, we focused on the optimal ratio of external procurement, *k as well as 
either *k  = 0 or *k  = 1 and the proposed algorithm yields the best solution for the 
coordinated decision models. While Sinha et al (2007) focused on either *k = 0 or *k = 1 
to make only binary decisions on emergency procurement under shortage, the proposed 
algorithm yields the best optimal solution for *k  with the coordinated policy through the 
proposed solution procedure. It is also shown numerically that a coordinated policy has a 
better system profit in numerical examples. 
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 Individual Decision  
Model 
Supplier Driven Model Retailer Driven Model Joint Coordination Model 
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Table 3.3 Summary of Q* according to the range of k* 
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3.4.2 Analysis of the coordinated decision model for optimal sourcing 
The proposed two-stage supply chain coordination model is proposed to determine 
the optimal conditions for profit maximization when external procurement in case of 
capacity shortage may be a better option to improve the whole channel profit. We apply a 
non-linear optimization approach thereby to obtain the best solutions to increase the profits 
of both the retailer and the supplier beyond their non-coordinated policies in supply chains. 
Thus, we can reach the optimal solutions for profit maximization by solving the following 
non-linear optimization model for a given n. 
 
Maximize  
ch   
Subject to, 
(1)  k  ≥ 0        (3.23) 
(2)  k  ≤ 1          
(3)  nQ ≤ D         
(4)  n ε  I [Integer]                                                                   
(5)  Q > 0.         
 
The objective of the non-linear mixed integer programming is to find out the best 
optimal conditions when emergency procurement from an external source is a better option 
to improve the total profit of the entire supply chain system. In addition, this coordination 
mechanism in supply chains helps maximize the profits of both the retailer and the supplier 
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beyond individual decision models. Numerical examples to show the various cases of the 
proposed model will be presented in the next section. 
 
3.5 Model Analysis 
This section presents a theoretical analysis of the proposed models developed in the 
previous sections above: 
 
3.5.1 Optimization 
A nonlinear mixed integer optimization problem is formulated in this chapter to be solved 
for the optimal ratio of emergency procurement, the optimal order quantity, and the 
minimum number of shipment A heuristic algorithm is provided to find the optimal ratio of 
* *,n Q  and 
*k such that the total joint profit of the supply chain system is maximized. 
Figure 3.2 shows the behaviors of the optimal solutions under different settings of 
the external procurement price (p0) while n holds constant at the optimal solution. As the 
external procurement price (p0) changes, the optimal ratio of external procurement (k) is 
determined, and accordingly the optimal solution is obtained. Obviously we see that it has 
the high sensitivity to the system overall benefit. 
Table 3.4 presents a summary of the optimal solutions of the proposed models in 
this chapter. Under a normal setting of the system parameters (  = 0.8, r = 0.05, 
0p = 48) 
while all the other parameters hold constant, we see that the joint coordination model and 
the supplier driven model have the best performances for profit maximization, and the 
retailer driven model has the second best among the proposed models. Individual decision 
model without considerations of coordination has the worst performance in our case.
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Table 3.4 Comparison of heuristic approach and simultaneous optimization 
n-1 n n+1 n-1 n n+1 n-1 n n+1
n
* 2 2.60 3 2 2.81 3 2 2.95 3
Q
* 533.06 532.77 532.6 800 709.86 692.82 562.26 480.02 477.24
k
* 0.8084 0.8031 0.8002 0.8157 0.8135 0.8130 0.8077 0.8033 0.8032
∏b 91,875.5 92,068.7 92,968.2 94,645.3 94,651.3 94,700.3
∏v 16,293.6 16,302.3 15,379.3 13,225.70 13,291.8 13,240.1
∏ch 108,291.1 108,371.0 108,347.5 107,871.0 107,943.1 107,940.4 108291.7 108,397.8 108397.7
Heuristic Approach vs. Simultaneous Optimization
Retailer’s Driven Model Supplier’s Driven Model Joint Coordination Model
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(i) 
0p  = 42 (ii) 0p = 46 (iii) 0p = 52 
 
Table 3.5 Total profit at the optimal k* and Q*according to outsourcing price, 
0p  (when 45bp  ) 
Total Profit, 
ch   Total Profit, ch  
Total Profit, 
ch  
k k k Q Q Q 
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3.5.2 Profit Maximization 
In this section we check the sufficient conditions for the proposed optimization models. To 
make profit maximization of supply chain system, theoretically the concavity of the profit 
function of each model is checked by the Hessian matrix. 
First, for an individual decision model, it is sufficient to show ( )b Q is concave 
for Q > 0. From Eq. (3.1),  
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Thus the determinant of the Hessian matrix is negative, and the given function has a local 
maximum. It can be also proved numerically that the Hessian matrix at the stationary point 
is negative definite and the stationary point is a local maximum.  
 
3.5.3 Pricing Strategy for External Procurement 
Fig. 3.5 shows how much a supplier respond with strategy to handle shortage issues. These 
two graphs actually present how much a supplier is willing to pay for emergent 
procurement from an external supplier to make up for shortage on its side. We see that as 
< 0 
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the external procurement price ( 0p ) and the fixed penalty cost for shortage increase, the 
total net profit of the entire supply chain is supposed to go down. 
For example, when 0p  is less than 40, the supplier need to choose the coordinated 
policy to maximize the total profit of the chain. But if 0p  goes beyond 49.970, the optimal 
ratio of k* becomes zero, which means that the external procurement is not recommended, 
even though the coordinated decision making model always makes a higher profit than that 
under the individual policy. The same logic and procedures can be applied to penalty costs 
for shortage in Fig. 3.5. When the penalty cost for shortage is too high and goes beyond a 
certain threshold or an upper bound, then supplier will go for complete outsourcing to 
avoid any penalty. On the other hands, in case the penalty cost for shortage is quite low, 
then supplier may decide not to outsource since it is more beneficial anymore to take that 
shortage as goodwill-loss. Thus theoretically we determine the optimal range of the 
external procurement price and the fixed penalty cost with consideration of all the cost 
factors in the supply chain coordination model.  
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Figure 3.2 Effects on the ratio of emergency procurement k*, as external procurement price (p0) and the fixed penalty cost for shortage 
(g) changes 
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3.5.4 Profit Sharing and Compensation Policy 
Several researchers have shown that one partner’s gain may exceed the other partner’s loss 
in the integrated model in the literature. Thus, the net benefit should be shared between the 
supplier and the retailer in some equitable fashion. In the literature Goyal (1976) proposed 
a simple compensation policy according to the sacrifice of each participant to the entire 
profit of the supply chain. This policy aims at sharing the benefits and the losses of the 
entire supply chain system according to the ratio of individual models’ contributions to the 
profit of the supply chain. In this section, we revised Goyal’s compensation policy 
according to their contributions to the total profit of the supply chain and then, we get the 
ratios for profit sharing as follows: 
 
 
Note that 1b vZ Z   , where b  = total profit function of the retailer, v  = total cost 
function of the supplier. 
 
 
Among the most common ways used for supply chain coordination we may 
consider a side-payment contract. In the literature, side-payment contracts have been 
widely used in economics and finance fields to share the profits and costs. Robin and 
Carter (1995) defined side-payment as ‘‘an additional monetary transfer between supplier 
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(3.29) 
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(seller) and buyer that is used as an incentive for deviating from the individual optimal 
policy” According to this definition, we find that the side-payment in supply chains should 
be a monetary transfer that two channel members make so as to improve the chain wide 
performance; so, it is also known as transfer payment, compensation, reimbursement, etc. 
We find some practical examples in which business organizations in supply chains transfer 
side-payments for supply chain coordination. Shapiro (1998) reported a real story in which 
the Hollywood studios and Blockbuster (which is a video store in the United States) signed 
a side-payment contract to coordinate the two-echelon video supply chain. Specifically, in 
order to entice the Hollywood studios to reduce their wholesale prices, the video store 
Blockbuster agreed to transfer a part of her sale revenue to those Hollywood studios who 
decrease their prices. This side-payment contract is well known as ‘‘revenue-sharing” 
contract. We will leave this part as a future research direction. 
  
81 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
COORDINATING A TWO-STAGE SUPPLY CHAIN WITH 
IMPERFECT QUALITY ITEMS AND NONLINEAR PRICE 
DEPENDENT DEMAND 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Determining inventory policy in classical inventory control models is usually done 
independently between supplier and retailer. This yields sub-optima solution based on each 
point of view while in such rush competition both supplier and retailer need to collaborate 
in reducing total cost of the whole system. One of the weaknesses of current inventory 
models is the unrealistic assumption that all items produced are of good quality (Walters, 
1994). Defective items, as a result of considering imperfect quality production process 
were initially considered by Rosenblatt and Lee (1986) and Porteus (1986). Besides 
imperfect quality assumption in production process, other factors such as damages and 
breakages during the handling process may also result in defective items. The above 
consideration was included in Salameh and Jaber (2000) who were the few authors who 
presented a model for items with imperfect quality. Later, Goyal and Cardenas-Barron 
(2002) then reconsidered the work done in Salameh and Jaber (2000) and presented a 
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practical approach for determining the optimal lot size. They assumed that poor items are 
withdrawn from stock and no shortage was allowed. Wee (1993) developed an economic 
production plan for deteriorating items with partial backordering, but he assumed perfect 
quality. 
The idea of optimizing the joint total cost in a single-supplier and a single-retailer 
model was first introduced by Goyal (1976). Many researchers, such as Banerjee (1986), 
Hill (1997), Ouyang, Wu and Ho (2004), Rad, Khoshalhan and Tarokh (2011), Rad and 
Khoshalhan (2011) have then extended the work of Goyal (1976).  Jokar and Sajadieh 
(2009) have described a supplier–retailer integrated production inventory model which 
takes into consideration Joint Economic Lot Sizing (JELS) policy with price sensitive 
demand of the customer. Jokar and Sajadieh (2009) detailed a JELS model where the 
shipment; ordering and pricing policy are all optimized. They investigated the 
effectiveness of customer price sensitive linear demand. Uddin and Sano (2010) depicted a 
linear fraction model that maximizes the return on investment and finds the location for the 
facility. They also discussed an mixed integer programming (MIP) based approach to solve 
linear fractional problem. 
Another issue in the lot sizing area that has attracted the attention of numerous 
researchers is the integration of production and pricing. One of the first models of this kind 
was formulated by Kunreuther and Richard (1971), who incorporated pricing into the 
traditional EOQ model considering a linear price. A multitude of researchers have 
developed a joint inventory model for manufacturer-retailer, where market demand is a 
function of price (e.g., Viswanathan and Wang 2003; Ray et al. 2005; Bakal et al. 2008, 
Wang et al 2015). 
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Recently, Kim, Hong, and Kim (2011) discussed joint pricing and ordering policies 
for price-dependent demand in a supply chain consisting of a single retailer and a single 
manufacturer. Some other researchers such as Ho, Ouyang and Su (2008), Chen and Kang 
(2010) and Chung and Liao (2011) also developed integrated inventory models that 
involve price-sensitive demands. The main focus of these works were on trade credit 
policies and they considered flexible production rates by assuming that the production rate 
can be varied in the fixed ratios of the demand rate. 
To the best of knowledge, very few of the above-mentioned integrated production-
inventory marketing models focused on investing the effects of coordination on the 
performance of the supply chain under quality uncertainty, especially when the demand 
rate has an iso-elastic function of the selling price. Therefore, the aims of this article are to 
study an integrated inventory model that considers operations and pricing decisions, and to 
investigate the effect of coordination on the system.  
End customer demand is assumed to be an iso-elastic function of the selling price 
to account for the impact of price changes on customer demand. Furthermore, the 
production rate is finite and proportional to the demand rate (see for example Ho, 2011; 
Chang et al., 2009). To optimize the joint total profit, the selling price, order quantity and 
number of shipments will be determined in this study. 
For the sake of this study, a non-linear mixed integer programming based model 
has been formulated by combining price sensitive demand and coordination between 
members of the supply chain. To control unstable consumers demand, a new exponential 
price sensitive demand function is introduced. This work introduces the exponential price 
sensitive demand function not just because it has become popular among researchers, but 
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because the form includes an explicit term for price elasticity and is easy to manipulate 
mathematically. Further, it has been pointed out by many researchers, the results obtained 
from linear demand function may not suitable to apply directly in the case of nonlinear 
demand function. The goal of this work is to determine the individual and coordinated 
profit with the new exponential demand function.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces some assumptions and 
notations. An individual decision model of supplier and retailer are proposed in Section 3.3 
and a joint coordination model and the solution procedure are proposed in Section 4.3. A 
numerical example and sensitivity analysis are followed in Section 4.4 and 4.5. Summary 
and concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.6.  
 
4.2 Assumptions 
We consider a simple supply chain problem with a single manufacturer/seller and a single 
retailer/retailer we discussed in the chapter 3. The same inventory patterns of both 
retailer/retailer and the supplier/supplier illustrated in Figure 3.1 is used in this chapter. In 
addition, the same scenarios used in the previous chapter are discussed. The mathematical 
models in this chapter are developed based on the following assumptions and notations: 
 
Assumptions 
1. Single manufacturer-single retailer supply chain, which is the simple and basic 
form of the supply chains and could be a start to present and to extend more 
complicated and real inventory models, is considered.  
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2. The demand rate is a decreasing function of the selling price ( ) ( ) Cb bD p a p
  
where the slope a > 0 and the constant elasticity C > 0. 
3. Shortage is allowed. 
4. The inventory is continuously reviewed. 
5. The retailer orders Q quantity from the supplier. The supplier manufactures a 
production lot Qp = nQ at one setup, and dispatches it to the retailer in n shipments 
with size Q, where n is a positive integer. 
6. The retailer’s inventory holding cost per item per unit time is hb; the supplier’s 
inventory holding cost per item per unit time is hv, and hb > hv. 
7. The time horizon is infinite. 
 
4.3 Model Formulation 
 Consider a supply chain for an imperfect product comprising of a single supplier as 
a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain when the product is single. The retailer has an 
annual demand rate of ( ) ( ) Cb bD p a p
 units for the given product and the first market 
demand is a non-linear function of price. The retailer orders a lot of size Q and the 
manufacturer produces the product at the production rate P in order to deliver the finished 
products with imperfect quality to the retailer. 
  
4.3.1 Non-coordinated Decision Model 
In this section we consider an individual decision model in a two-stage supply 
chain, we assume there is no coordination between a supplier and a retailer, which may 
represent any two upstream-downstream participants that are independently managed. In 
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this model, the supplier and the retailer do not cooperate with each other to make decisions 
to maximize the system profit. Each participant makes its own decision to maximize its 
individual profit. We consider two cases when supplier dominates supply chain decisions 
and when retailer has a channel power and drives market decisions. 
 
4.3.1.1 Retailer driven model 
In a retailer’s perspective model with assumption of a price dependent market demand, we 
assume that the retailer has the greater channel power to initiate the replenishment decision 
to maximize its individual profit. The supplier needs to make decisions subject to the 
retailer’s optimal decisions. Since the market demand is a function of the retail price, and 
we assume the market demand is quite price-sensitive, the retailer as market leader makes 
better profit rather than the market follower, supplier in general. 
 A retailer driven model consists of two sub-problems and can be solved in 
sequence. First the retailer makes decisions to maximize its individual profit in the 
retailer’s own problem, which means that the retailer makes decisions on
*
rp , 
*Q  and 
*n for 
the supplier and the supplier adjusts its policy according to them. The retailer’s optimal 
decisions, in turn, become one constraint in the supplier’s problem, whose objective is to 
maximize the supplier’s profit through making decisions on manufacturing, replenishment, 
supply etc. Thus we can obtain the profit functions of the retailer and supplier as below 
 
b  = Gross revenue – Purchasing cost – Ordering cost – Holding cost  
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From Eq. (4.1), the retailer’s individual optimal lot size Q* is obtained as follows 
 
Accordingly, by plugging the optimal order quantity, Q* in Eq. (4.13), the retailer’s 
individual optimal profit is given by 
By taking the first order derivative of Eq. (4.15) with respect to bp , we have 
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From Eq. (4.3), corresponding to the lot size that the retailer determined, the supplier’s 
profit function can be obtained as follows: 
From Eq. (4.17), the optimal number of delivery batches per production run, *n  of 
the supply chain system is expressed as follows: 
 
Thus, the total profit function of the supply chain system is given by 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
*
2
2 { 2 ( ) 2 2 ( ) ( ) }
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(4.5) 
* *( , )v n Q  
= Gross revenue – Purchasing cost – Production Cost – Procurement Cost – 
Setup cost – Holding cost – Penalty Cost for Shortage   
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From Eq. (4.19), by taking the first derivative of the total profit function of the supply 
chain system, we can obtain the solution of the optimal sourcing problem as follows 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Supplier driven model 
In a supplier’s perspective coordination model, the supplier has the greater channel power 
and makes decisions (e.g. supply, replenishment, manufacturing, etc.) independently to 
maximize its individual profit. Consequently, the retailer has to make decisions (e.g. 
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replenishment, selling, etc.) subject to the supplier’s optimal decisions. The retailer adjusts 
its policy according to the supplier’s decisions on 
*n  and *Q . But the supplier cannot 
determine the retail price, 
*
bp  even though we assume the supplier has a dominant channel 
power in a supply chain. The supplier needs to accept the retail price (
*
bp ) information 
from the retailer’s side. The assumption of the supplier driven model usually makes sense 
in the situations where the supplier and retailer are two independent departments (or 
facilities) in the same company. For instance, the supplier may represent a warehouse 
owned by the logistics department and the retailer may represent a retail outlet owned by 
the marketing department.  
A supplier’s perspective model consists of two sub-problems and can be solved in 
sequence. First, the supplier’s problem aims to make the optimal decisions (e.g. 
manufacturing, replenishment, supply, etc.) for the manufacturer/supplier to maximize its 
individual profit. The retailer’s problem, in turn, aims to make the optimal decisions (e.g. 
replenishment and selling price, etc.) for the retailer to maximize its individual profit, 
subject to the retailer’s optimal decisions obtained in the supplier’s problem. 
 In this model the supplier determines this lot size *Q  by taking the first derivative 
of the supplier’s profit function with respect to Q and finds an optimal 
*n  corresponding 
to Q* to maximize its individual profit v . The supplier’s individual profit function can 
be expressed as follows. 
v  = Gross revenue – Production Cost – Emergency Procurement Cost – Setup 
cost – Holding cost – Penalty Cost for Shortage   
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From Eq. (3.8), the supplier’s individual optimal lot size Q* is obtained as follows: 
In a similar way, from Eq. (3.8), the supplier can derive the number of the shipments per 
batch production run, 
*n  as follows 
Corresponding to the supplier’s decision, the retailer adjusts its decisions on Q* . By 
taking the first order derivative of Eq. (4.15) with respect to bp , we have 
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From Eq. (4.10),  by plugging Eq. (4.11), we obtain  
 
The total profit function of the supplier’s perspective coordination system with lost sales is 
obtained as follows: 
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From Eq. (3.12), by taking the first derivative of the total profit function of the supply 
chain system, we can obtain the solution of the optimization problem as follows 
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4.3.2 Joint Coordination model 
If the retailer chooses its selling price and ordering quantity
* *( , )bp Q , and the supplier 
determines its number of shipment n, then the total system profit under independent 
optimization, 
* * *( , , )ch bp Q n  is equal to the sum of the retailer’s and the supplier’s profits, 
i.e., 
* * * * * *( , , ) ( , ) ( )ch b b b vp Q n p Q n   . Consider the situation where the supplier and 
the retailer decide to coordinate and share information with each other to determine the 
best policy together for the integrated supply chain system. In case of stock-outs in a 
supply chain, as we introduced in the previous chapter, by determining the optimal fraction 
(k*) of the demand shortfall that may be recovered by outsourcing or external procurement, 
we can easily obtain the profit functions of the retailer and supplier for each model. 
 
Therefore, the total profit function of the supply chain system can be obtained by 
* * * *( , , , )ch bp Q n k  
=  * * *( , )  ( ) b b vp Q n     
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Since both the supplier’s and the retailer/retailer fully cooperate with each other to make 
decisions that minimize the total costs and maximize the system profit, 
 they can make coordinated decisions on *Q and 
*n . From Eq. (4.20), the optimal lot size 
*Q of the entire supply chain system is obtained as follows: 
From Eq. (4.20), in a similar way the optimal number of delivery batches per production 
run, *n  of the supply chain system is expressed as follows 
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By taking the first order derivative of Eq. (4.15) with respect to bp , we have 
 
Then we obtain 
 
 
From Eq. (3.20), by taking the first derivative of the total profit function of the supply 
chain system with respect to k, we can obtain the solution of the optimization problem as 
follows: 
 
1
1
1.5
 = [[ (1 )] ( ) [ (1 )]( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )[ (1 )][ {(2 ) ( 1)}]
[ (1 )]2 ( ) ( )[ {(2 ) ( 1)}]
1, 1, [ (1 )] 1, ,
C Cch
b b b
b
C v
b b b
C v
b b b
k a p k p p a C p
p
c
a C p c k h n n
n
c
k a p c h n n
n
D
where k k
P
   
  
  
   
  
 
 
 
      

      

     
     
  
 
 
 
(4.20) 
*
2 2 2 2 2 3 2 4
2 2 2 2 2
3 2 2
2 2
( )
=exp [ ln( ]
( )
( ) [(2 ( ) ( ) 4 ( ) ( ) 2 ( )
( ) 2 4 ( )
4 ( ) 2 2 ( ) ]
( ) ( )
1,
b b b
b
b b
b
b b
b
p p p
b v v
p
b v b v v v v
p p
v v
b v b b b b v b v v
X p
p p C
Y p
where X p a C n p e C n p e C n e
C c h n C c h n C c h n Cnp e
Cn e C c h n e
Y p h C c h n c n c n c h c n c
where k 
 
  
   
  
     
 1, [ (1 )] 1, ,
D
k
P
      
  
 
 
 
(4.21) 
0 0 0*
*
0 0*
0
*
(1 ) ( ) [ 2 ] 0,
(1 )
1
[ ]
2 (1 )
2[{ (1 )} ( ) ( ) (1 )]
( )
(1 ) (1 ) (2 ) ( 1)
Cch b
b b
b
b
C C
b b b v
C
b
b v
c
a p p p g k g g
k Q r
c
k p p g g
g Q r
k a p c n a p c r
where Q
a p
n r h r h n n
P

  

 

 
       
 
     

   

  
       
  
 
 
 
 
(4.22) 
97 
 
So far we have derived the net profit functions and the optimal policies of each supply 
chain model. For the proposed individual and coordinated models in this chapter, the 
results of individual optimization and coordinated decision are summarized in the Table 
4.2. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of optimal policies (I) 
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 Supplier Driven Model 
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Table 4.2 Summary of optimal policies (I) 
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Table 4.3 Summary of optimal policies (II) 
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4.4 Solution Procedure 
The ultimate objective of the proposed models in this chapter is to find the optimal ratio of 
emergency procurement, the optimal order quantity, and the minimum number of shipment 
such that the total joint profit of the supply chain system is maximized. These nonlinear 
optimization problems are to be solved for * * *, ,bp n Q  and 
*k . To solve this non-linear 
optimization model, we apply the following iterative heuristic algorithm which is used in 
some articles such as Ray, Gerchak and Jewkes (2005), Sajadieh and Jokar (2009), and 
Chen and Kang (2010) to find the optimal solution (pr*, Q*, n*, k*). To solve this non-
linear optimization model, we modify the iterative algorithm used in the chapter 3. 
 
Step 0. Let n = 0 and set  ( ) ( ) ( ), 0, ,n n nc bh p  Q  n  k  . 
Step 1. Set n = 1. 
Step 2. Determine pb
(n) by solving the first derivative function of each model with respect 
to pb. 
Step 3. Compute the value of Q(n)  
Step 3. Compute the value of k(n)  
Step 4. Calculate ch ( pb
(n), Q(n), n, k(n)) using Eq. (4.20). 
Step 5. If ch (pb
(n), Q(n), n, k(n)) ≥ ch (pb
(n-1), Q(n-1), n-1, k(n-1)), then go to step 6. 
Otherwise, the optimal solution is (pb*, Q*, n*, k*) = (pb
(n-1), Q(n-1), n-1, k(n-1)). 
Step 6. Let n = n + 1, then go to step 2. 
  
102 
 
We first assume that n is a continuous variable. As ch  is convex in n, the following 
equation for n can be obtained by solving the first derivative function of ch . For a given 
value of n, therefore the optimal value for the selling price bp for a fixed value of n can be 
obtained by taking the first-order partial derivative of ch  with respect to bp and setting it 
equal to zero (this is the necessary condition for optimality), and solving for bp
numerically. For example, the fsolve procedure of MATLAB or solve function in MAPLE 
could be used to solve this equation, as was done in this paper.  
 
Following the above-mentioned procedures, the maximum system profit can be derived in 
these three cases, where, (i) emergency supply option is available ( *k ≠ 0), (ii) emergency 
procurement is not possible ( *k = 0), and complete outsourcing ( *k = 1) for a given unit 
external procurement price 0p . (See the Table 4.3.) We see that 
*k is highly related with 
Q* in retailer’s perspective coordination model and integrated joint coordination model. In 
addition, in both the individual decision model and the supplier’s perspective coordination 
model, change in *k does not affect Q*.  
 From Table 4.3., if we take the highest value of k  possible for a corresponding 
optimal value of Q and the possible maximum of k = 1, then the maximum system profit 
will be obtained. Thus, it is found that for a particular value of n and Q, as long as 
0 0*(1
] 0
)
[ bb
c
p p g g
Q r
  

 , system profit increases with increasing k  and reaches the 
maximum value when the ratio of external procurement reaches the optimal value *.k On 
the other hand, if 0 0*(1
] 0
)
[ bb
c
p p g g
Q r
  

 , it is better not to choose the emergency 
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procurement option. The underlying mechanism is to manipulate lot size Q in such a way 
that the overall system cost is decreased and the savings can be utilized to go for 
outsourcing even at a higher price till a particular limiting value. The underlying 
mechanism is with consideration of all cost factors which includes inventory holding cost, 
ordering cost, transportation cost, etc. to optimize the lot size Q and the savings of the 
whole system can be utilized for the emergency supply option until the emergency 
procurement price goes up to a particular price much higher than the retail price. In the 
solution procedure, we focused on the optimal ratio of external procurement, *k as well as 
either *k  = 0 or *k  = 1 and the proposed algorithm yields the best solution for the 
coordinated decision models. While Sinha et al (2007) focused on either *k = 0 or *k = 1 
to make only binary decisions on emergency procurement under shortage, the proposed 
algorithm yields the best optimal solution for *k  with the coordinated policy through the 
proposed solution procedure. It is also shown numerically that a coordinated policy has a 
better system profit in numerical examples. 
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4.5 Model Analysis 
This section presents a theoretical analysis of the proposed models developed in the 
previous sections above: 
 
4.5.1 Optimization 
A nonlinear mixed integer optimization problem is formulated in this chapter to be solved 
for the optimal ratio of emergency procurement, the optimal order quantity, and the 
minimum number of shipment A heuristic algorithm is provided to find the optimal ratio of 
* * *, ,bn p Q  and 
*k such that the total joint profit of the supply chain system is maximized. 
Figure 3.2 shows the behaviors of the optimal solutions under different settings of 
the external procurement price (p0) while n holds constant at the optimal solution. As the 
external procurement price (p0) changes, the optimal ratio of external procurement (k) is 
determined, and accordingly the optimal solution is obtained. Obviously we see that it has 
the high sensitivity to the system overall benefit. 
Table 3.4 presents a summary of the optimal solutions of the proposed models in 
this chapter. Under a normal setting of the system parameters (  = 0.8, r = 0.05, 0p = 48) 
while all the other parameters hold constant, we see that the joint coordination model and 
the supplier driven model have the best performances for profit maximization, and the 
retailer driven model has the second best among the proposed models. Individual decision 
model without considerations of coordination has the worst performance in our case.  
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  Retailer’s Driven Model Supplier’s Driven Model Joint Coordination Model 
  n-1 n* n+1 n-1 n* n+1 n-1 n* n+1 
n 4 4.85 5 8 8.06 9 66 66.63 67 
pb 63.2964 63.2964 63.2964 63.0033 63.0033 63.0033 54.347 54.3444 54.347 
Q 498.39 511.33 498.39 845.78 455.37 692.82 186.32 187.16 185.02 
k 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4299 1.0000 0.4206 
∏b   77,225.2     282,751.6         
∏v   212,090.7     7,055.0         
∏ch 272,480.5 289,315.9 272,505.8 288,770.6 289,806.6 107,940.4 295787.8 304,259.6 295645.9 
 
Table 4.4 Comparison of heuristic approach and simultaneous optimization 
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4.5.2 Profit Maximization 
In this section we check the sufficient conditions for the proposed optimization models. To 
make profit maximization of supply chain system, theoretically the concavity of the profit 
function of each model is checked by the Hessian matrix. 
First, for an individual decision model, it is sufficient to show ( )b Q is concave for 
Q > 0. From Eq. (4.5),  
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A sufficient condition for a local maximum in the joint coordination model is obtained as 
follows: 
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When we plug Q* in the total profit function, ( , , , )ch bn p Q k , we obtain the full Hessian 
matrix using Maple software (See the appendix A.) We find that the determinant of the 
Hessian matrix is negative, and the given function has a local maximum. It can be also 
proved numerically that the Hessian matrix at the stationary point is negative definite and 
the stationary point is a local maximum.  
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Appendix  
B.1. Sufficient condition for a local maximum in the joint coordination model. 
The Hessian matrix of the profit function of the model can be written as follows:
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− 𝑎(1 − 𝐶)𝐶(𝑏 + (1 − 𝑏)𝑘)𝑝−1−𝐶 + 𝑎(1 − 𝑏)(−1 − 𝐶)𝐶𝑘𝑝−2−𝐶p0
+ 𝑎𝑏(−1 − 𝐶)𝐶𝑝−2−𝐶𝑞 +
𝑎𝑏(−1 − 𝐶)𝐶𝑑𝑝−2−𝐶
𝑛𝑄
+
𝑎(−1 − 𝐶)𝐶hv(2 − 𝑛)𝑝−2−𝐶𝑄
2𝑃
+
𝑎𝑐(−1 − 𝐶)𝐶(𝑏 + (1 − 𝑏)𝑘)𝑝−2−𝐶
𝑄(1 − 𝑟)
,
𝑎𝐶hv(2 − 𝑛)𝑝−1−𝐶
2𝑃
−
𝑎𝑏𝐶𝑑𝑝−1−𝐶
𝑛𝑄2
−
𝑎𝑐𝐶(𝑏 + (1 − 𝑏)𝑘)𝑝−1−𝐶
𝑄2(1 − 𝑟)
, −𝑎(1 − 𝑏)𝐶g0(1 − 𝑘)𝑝−1−𝐶
− 𝑎(1 − 𝑏)𝐶(𝑔 − g0𝑘)𝑝−1−𝐶 + 𝑎(1 − 𝑏)(1 − 𝐶)𝑝−𝐶
+ 𝑎(1 − 𝑏)𝐶𝑝−1−𝐶p0 +
𝑎(1 − 𝑏)𝑐𝐶𝑝−1−𝐶
𝑄(1 − 𝑟)
} , 
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{−
1
2
hv (1 −
𝑎𝑝−𝐶
𝑃
) −
𝑎𝑏𝑑𝑝−𝐶
𝑛2𝑄2
,
𝑎𝐶hv(2 − 𝑛)𝑝−1−𝐶
2𝑃
−
𝑎𝑏𝐶𝑑𝑝−1−𝐶
𝑛𝑄2
−
𝑎𝑐𝐶(𝑏 + (1 − 𝑏)𝑘)𝑝−1−𝐶
𝑄2(1 − 𝑟)
, −
2𝑎𝑏𝑑𝑝−𝐶
𝑛𝑄3
−
2𝑎𝑐(𝑏 + (1 − 𝑏)𝑘)𝑝−𝐶
𝑄3(1 − 𝑟)
,
𝑎(1 − 𝑏)𝑐𝑝−𝐶
𝑄2(1 − 𝑟)
} , 
{0, −𝑎(1 − 𝑏)𝐶g0(1 − 𝑘)𝑝−1−𝐶 − 𝑎(1 − 𝑏)𝐶(𝑔 − g0𝑘)𝑝−1−𝐶 + 𝑎(1 − 𝑏)(1 − 𝐶)𝑝−𝐶
+ 𝑎(1 − 𝑏)𝐶𝑝−1−𝐶p0 +
𝑎(1 − 𝑏)𝑐𝐶𝑝−1−𝐶
𝑄(1 − 𝑟)
,
𝑎(1 − 𝑏)𝑐𝑝−𝐶
𝑄2(1 − 𝑟)
, −2𝑎(1
− 𝑏)g0𝑝−𝐶}} 
 
We can find the determinant of the Hessian matrix is negative and the profit 
function of the joint coordination above has a local maximum. It can be also proved 
numerically with the system parameters. We see the Hessian matrix at the stationary point 
is negative definite.  
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2
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CHAPTER 5 
 
POST-OPTIMAL ANALYSIS 
 
  
5.1 Post-Optimality Analysis 
In this chapter, we conduct post-optimal analyses for the optimal solutions we obtained in 
the previous chapters. Post-optimal analysis so called sensitivity analysis is a technique 
used to determine how different values of an independent variable will impact a particular 
dependent variable under a given set of assumptions. This technique is used within specific 
boundaries that will depend on one or more input variables, such as the effect that changes 
in interest rates will have on a bond's price. Sensitivity analysis is a way to predict the 
outcome of a decision if a situation turns out to be different compared to the key 
prediction(s). Sensitivity analysis is very useful when attempting to determine the impact 
the actual outcome of a particular variable will have if it differs from what was previously 
assumed. By creating a given set of scenarios, the analyst can determine how changes in 
one variable(s) will impact the target variable. 
In the chapter 4, an integrated production-inventory-marketing model for a two-
stage supply chain is presented. It is assumed the demand rate is an iso-elastic function of 
the selling price. Then, the total cost functions are developed, and the optimal values of the 
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selling price, order quantity and number of shipments are obtained under independent and 
joint optimizations. A numerical example and the sensitivity analysis are done, and the 
main following findings are attained. 
Referring to the existing literature such as Sajadieh and Jokar (2009) and Chen and 
Kang (2010), we discuss an example with the following data: cb = $200/order, cv = 
$1200/setup, p = 2.5$/unit, wp =$5/unit, β =0.8, hb = $0.5/unit/year, hv = 0.25/unit/year, 
a=300,000 and b=1.245. Therefore, D(p)= 2.35100,000,000( )rp
 . The percentage 
improvement (PI) i.e., 
joint
100
ind
ind
PI
 
 

 is calculated to shed light on the benefits of 
joint optimization where 
joint  represent the total system profit under joint and ind  does 
independent optimization respectively. The total improvement should then be shared in 
some equitable manner and some kind of profit-sharing mechanism such as a side payment 
from the supplier to the retailer, or a price discount scheme needs to be employed in order 
to encourage cooperation and entice the retailer to change his/her lot size (see for example 
Ouyang, Wu & Ho, 2004; Goyal, 1976; Sajadieh and Jokar, 2009). 
In order to emphasize the role of coordination in the total profit, a selection of randomly 
generated problem instances are solved and summarized in Table 5.1. In a second step, 
some of the model parameters are varied and their impact on the optimal solution and the 
total profit are studied. 
 
5.2 Numerical Example and Sensitivity Analysis of Deterministic Demand Model 
In this section, we present a numerical example and sensitivity analysis for both individual 
and coordinated models developed in the previous sections. To illustrate the behavior of 
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our model, we adopt the same model input parameters used by the Goyal and 
Gopalakrishnan (1996), and Sinha and Sarmah (2007). Assuming a supplier provides 
10,000 units annually to a retailer in a supply chain, the other corresponding data after 
tidying up are shown in Table. 3.4. 
 
 
To investigate the effects of changes in the system parameters on the optimal solution and 
the total system profit, a sensitivity analysis is conducted and the results for critical 
parameters are summarized in the following: 
 
 
 
5.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis for the index of the fraction of the market demand satisfied by 
supplier (  ) 
Table 5.2 shows how sensitively the optimal solutions will change according to the change 
in the fraction of the demand satisfied by supplier (β) in the model. We assume that the 
initial supply by the supplier is equal to the market demand and we find the following 
relationship between k and β, 1 (1 )r k    .  Basically we see as β increases from 0.95 to 
1.0, the total profit of the system accordingly goes up. We also see there are no differences 
D pb pv p p0 cb cv 
10,000 45 35 30 48 80 200 
P hb hv β g g0 r 
15,000 or 
8000 
6 5 0.8 5 3 0.05 
Table 5.1  Model Input Parameters 
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between the performance of the supplier driven model and that of the joint coordination 
model in the near range of the optimal solutions (when β is between 0.95 and 1.00). In 
addition to that, when retailer drives the channel decisions coordination can provide bigger 
performance improvements (0.44~0.46%) at the highest level of β (0.95< β<1.0). 
 
 
5.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis the defective rate (r) 
Table 5.3 shows illustrates that as the defective rate, r, increases, the total profit function, 
decreases. As the defect rate r goes up, we see the PI(%) slightly increases. The 
coordinated supply chain always prefers to reduce the mean rate of defectives to increase 
its total profit through coordination. We also see there are no differences between the 
performance of the supplier driven model and that of the joint coordination model in the 
near range of the optimal solutions. In addition to that, when supplier and retailer pursue 
independent optimization in a supply chain, coordination can provide big improvements in 
the all rages of the defective rate. 
 
 
5.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis for the external procurement price ( 0p ) 
Table 3.9 illustrates how a supplier makes decisions on pricing issues to make up for 
shortage. This table se two graphs actually present how much a supplier is willing to pay 
for emergent procurement from an external supplier to make up for shortage on its side. 
We see that as the external procurement price ( 0p ) goes up, k and the total profit move 
down.  For example, when 0p  is below a certain threshold, the supplier will choose the 
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coordinated policy to maximize the total profit of the chain. But if 0p  goes beyond a upper 
bound, then the optimal ratio of k* becomes zero, which means that the external 
procurement is not recommended, even though the coordinated decision making model 
always makes a higher profit than that under the individual policy.  
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Table 5.2  Sensitivity Analysis for the index of the fraction of the market demand satisfied by supplier (β) 
n Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch
0.9500 2.85 529.81    0.0000 92,491.8 41,530.1 134,021.9
0.9625 2.83 535.88    0.2500   94,644.5 42,219.8 136,864.3
0.9750 2.83 540.17    0.5000   96,190.3 43,168.6 139,358.9
0.9875 2.83 542.73    0.7500   97,111.6 44,534.6 141,646.2
1.0000 2.85 543.58    1.0000   97,426.7 46,439.9 143,866.6
n Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch n Q k ∏ch
0.9500 2.97 757.07 0.0000 91,785.64   41,647.6 133,433.2 3.23 466.04 0.0000 134,050.2 0.02 0.46
0.9625 2.96 762.85 0.2500   93,940.53   42,337.7 136,278.2 3.22 471.38 0.2500   136,892.9 0.02 0.45
0.9750 2.96 768.05 0.5000   95,478.34   43,292.9 138,771.2 3.21 475.15 0.5000   139,387.7 0.02 0.44
0.9875 2.96 772.67 0.7500   96,398.93   44,653.6 141,052.5 3.22 477.40 0.7500   141,675.2 0.02 0.44
1.0000 2.97 776.74 1.0000   96,702.14   46,560.5 143,262.6 3.23 478.15 1.0000   143,895.7 0.02 0.44
PIRet.Joint (%)β
Retailer Driven Model Joint Coordination Model
PISup.Joint (%)
β
Supplier Driven Model
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Table 5.3  Sensitivity Analysis for the defective rate (r)
n Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch
0.01 3.09 765.94   1.0000 134,476.3 8,737.9 143,214.2
0.03 3.03 771.30   1.0000 134,459.8 8,778.8 143,238.6
0.05 2.97 776.74   1.0000 134,442.4 8,820.2 143,262.6
0.10 2.83 790.69   1.0000 134,407.4 8,913.1 143,320.5
0.15 2.70 805.16   1.0000 134,378.8 8,995.9 143,374.7
0.20 2.56 820.18   1.0000 134,328.8 9,095.4 143,424.2
n Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch n Q k ∏ch
0.01 2.97 521.61 1.0000 96,898.98  46,985.9 143,884.9 3.36 465.16 1.0000 143,911.5 0.49 0.02
0.03 2.91 532.37 1.0000 96,900.94  46,975.1 143,876.0 3.30 471.56 1.0000 143,903.8 0.46 0.02
0.05 2.85 543.58 1.0000 96,901.61  46,965.0 143,866.6 3.23 478.15 1.0000 143,895.7 0.44 0.02
0.10 2.70 573.78 1.0000 96,897.08  46,944.4 143,841.5 3.08 495.47 1.0000 143,873.1 0.39 0.02
0.15 2.55 607.53 1.0000 96,882.43  46,931.0 143,813.4 2.94 514.14 1.0000 143,847.1 0.33 0.02
0.20 2.40 645.50 1.0000 96,855.75  46,926.0 143,781.7 2.79 534.35 1.0000 143,817.0 0.27 0.02
r
Retailer Driven Model Joint Coordination Model
PISup.Joint (%) PIRet.Joint (%)
r
Supplier Driven Model
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Table 5.4  Sensitivity Analysis for the external procurement price (p0) 
n Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch
35 3 692.82   1.0000 149,771.1 -16,040.3 133,730.8
40 3 692.82   1.0000 139,771.1 -16,040.3 123,730.8
45 3 692.82   1.0000 129,771.1 -16,040.3 113,730.8
47 3 692.82   0.9797 125,329.4 -15,596.2 109,733.2
48 3 692.82   0.8130 120,076.5 -12,136.1 107,940.4
49 3 692.82   0.6464 115,492.2 -9,011.3 106,480.9
50 3 692.82   0.4797 111,572.8 -6,218.0 105,354.8
52 3 692.82   0.1464 105,735.4 -1,632.9 104,102.5
53 3 692.82   0.0000 104,014.2 -40.3 103,973.9
55 3 692.82   0.0000 104,014.2 -40.3 103,973.9
60 3 692.82   0.0000 104,014.2 -40.3 103,973.9
n Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch n Q k ∏ch
35 3 543.57 1.0000 96,901.61       37,206.9 134,108.5 3 482.98 1.0000 134,165.8 0.33 0.04
40 3 543.57 1.0000 96,901.61       27,206.9 124,108.5 3 482.98 1.0000 124,165.8 0.35 0.05
45 3 543.57 1.0000 96,901.61       17,206.9 114,108.5 3 482.98 1.0000 114,165.8 0.38 0.05
47 3 541.79 0.9672 96,255.79       13,859.2 110,115.0 3 482.11 0.9702 110,171.1 0.40 0.05
48 3 532.6 0.8002 92,968.15       15379.35 108,347.5 3 477.24 0.8032 108,397.7 0.42 0.05
49 3 523.26 0.6333 89,683.39       17230.51 106,913.9 3 472.32 0.6362 106,958.2 0.45 0.04
50 3 513.75 0.4663 86,397.64       19,416.6 105,814.2 3 467.34 0.4692 105,852.8 0.47 0.04
52 3 494.17 0.1325 79,833.19       24,783.2 104,616.4 3 457.23 0.1352 104,643.9 0.52 0.03
53 3 486.18 0.0000 77,228.72       27,282.4 104,511.1 3 453.07 0.0000 104,534.4 0.54 0.02
55 3 486.18 0.0000 77,228.72       27,282.4 104,511.1 3 453.07 0.0000 104,534.4 0.54 0.02
60 3 486.18 0.0000 77,228.72       27,282.4 104,511.1 3 453.07 0.0000 104,534.4 0.54 0.02
Retailer Driven Model Joint Coordination Model
PISup.Joint (%) PIRet.Joint (%)
p0
Supplier Driven Model
p0
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5.3 Numerical Example and Sensitivity Analysis of Price Dependent Demand 
Model 
In this section, we present a numerical example and sensitivity analysis for both individual 
and coordinated models with price dependent demand. 
 
5.3.1 Sensitivity analysis for the price elasticity, C 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, the percentage improvement, PI, increases by b. It means that 
for more price sensitive demands, joint optimization shows more improvements, and it is 
more beneficial. This result is similar to which Sajadieh and Jokar (2009) deduced for the 
integrated inventory model the linear price sensitive demand. Therefore, regardless of type 
of the demand functions, more price sensitive demands lead to more benefits through 
coordination. Thus we may conclude that allowing shortages and coordinating the system 
become more and more important for the supply chain as the market demand becomes 
more price-sensitive. Such a situation could occur, for example, in a high technology 
market where a new competitor enters the market and partially erodes the competitive 
advantage of an existing company. In such a case, since the technological difference 
between the products offered in the market becomes smaller, customers will focus more on 
the price of the product. In such a situation, coordinating the supply chain and allowing 
shortages can improve the position of the companies in the market. 
Another outcome can be inferred from Table 5.1 is that when the supply chain’s 
members optimize their inventory systems independently, the optimal selling price is 
higher than its values under joint optimization. In addition, as the sensitivity of demand to 
price increases, the difference between the selling price in independent and joint systems 
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increases, too. Consequently, cooperation leads to the higher demand, and so the total 
profit increases especially for more price sensitive demands. 
One more result we obtain from Table 5.2 is that as the sensitivity of demand in the 
selling price increases, the optimal price is reduced, which is a well-known result from the 
economics literature. The opposite effect is also clear: A decrease in the selling price 
induces an increase in demand, and this increases the optimal order and shortage 
quantities. 
 
5.3.2 Sensitivity analysis for the defective rate r 
Table 5.6  illustrates that as the defective rate, r, increases, the expected joint total profit, 
ch , and the improvement in the expected total profit (PI) (%), decrease. To evaluate the 
defect rate effect on n*, Q*, and ch , we examined different values of r (0.01 ≤ r ≤0.20 ). 
Table 5.6 shows the behaviors of the optimal solutions versus different r. From the results, 
we can see that when r increases, the values of Q increases; while n holds constant. 
Furthermore, as r increases, buyer’s reduction in cost increases; while vendor’s increment 
in profit decreases. Thus, when the defective rate increases, the supplier needs to deliver 
greater lot size per shipment to satisfy the buyer demand. As the defect rate increases, the 
supplier’s benefit increases simultaneously. This result indicates the greater the number of 
defects, the greater the importance of coordination for the supplier and retailer. Obviously, 
the defect rate has low sensitivity to the system’s overall benefit. In addition, the effects of 
the defective rate on the optimal values of the decision variables could be different 
depending on the parameters of the problem. The coordinated supply chain always makes 
better performances at its lower defective rate to increase its total profit. 
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5.3.3 Sensitivity analysis for the external procurement price (p0) 
Table 5.7 illustrates how a supplier makes decisions on pricing issues to make up for 
shortage. This table se two graphs actually present how much a supplier is willing to pay 
for emergent procurement from an external supplier to make up for shortage on its side. 
We see that as the external procurement price ( 0p ) goes up, k and the total profit move 
down.  
For example, when 0p  is below a certain threshold, the supplier will choose the 
coordinated policy to maximize the total profit of the chain. But if 0p  goes beyond a upper 
bound, then the optimal ratio of k* becomes zero, which means that the external 
procurement is not recommended, even though the coordinated decision making model 
always makes a higher profit than that under the individual policy.  
 
5.3.4 Sensitivity analysis for the ratio of the supplier’s setup cost to retailer’s ordering 
cost (cv/cb) 
 
As can be discerned from Table.5.8, an increase in the ratio of the supplier’s setup cost to 
retailer’s ordering cost (cv/cb) increases the number of shipments and the supplier’s 
production quantity. It is a reasonable result because under fixed value of ordering cost, cb, 
higher defective rate, r requires much higher setup cost, cv. In such a situation, it is 
expected from the supplier to increase its production quantity in each setup. Therefore, the 
number of shipments, n, and the supplier’s production quantity, Q, increase accordingly. 
Furthermore, percentage improvement PI, decreases by r. In the table, we conclude that the 
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coordination of the supply chain is less attractive when the supplier’s setup cost is 
considerably lower than the retailer’s ordering cost. In addition, we figure out the effect of 
the proportion of supplier to buyer ordering cost on PI. As illustrated, the improvement 
percentage increases by the ratio of cv /cb. In other words, it will be more beneficial for 
supply chains to cooperate with each other, as their ordering and setup costs are far from 
each other. However, the improvement in PI is negatively affected by retailer’s ordering 
cost decreases.   
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Table 5.5 Sensitivity Analysis for the price elasticity (C)  
 
n p b Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch n p b Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch
2.00 26.19 70.21 774.13 1.0000 96,705.92    760,588.8 857,294.7 2.00 4.54 70.00 4,485.32 1.0000   848,907.2 -27,421.4 821,485.8
2.35 2.71 61.27 431.80 1.0000 96,819.15    95,570.2 192,389.3 2.35 3.52 60.93 522.62    1.0000   182,469.7 10,002.9 192,472.6
2.50 2.08 58.75 334.17 1.0000 96,527.62    8,272.5 104,800.1 2.50 2.31 58.34 498.79    1.0000   93,603.9 11,185.4 104,789.3
2.75 1.79 55.61 216.60 1.0000 95,494.85    -57,328.1 38,166.8 2.75 1.89 55.00 379.28    0.8106   22,110.5 16,042.0 38,152.5
3.00 1.70 53.41 139.27 1.0000 93,556.51    -79,789.8 13,766.7 3.00 1.80 52.53 260.24    0.8092   -2,888.6 16,644.2 13,755.5
n p b Q k ∏ch
2.00 4.52 60.32 6,075.41 1.0000 867,281.4 1.16 5.57
2.35 5.66 52.68 345.34 1.0000 198,789.1 3.33 3.28
2.50 2.53 50.67 379.81 1.0000 108,488.3 3.52 3.53
2.75 1.38 48.28 364.25 1.0000 39,827.1 4.35 4.39
3.00 1.00 46.89 302.55 1.0000 14,536.0 5.59 5.67
Supplier Driven Model
C
C
PIRet.Joint (%)
C
Retailer Driven Model
Joint Coordination Model
PISup.Joint (%)
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Table 5.6 Sensitivity Analysis for the index of the defective rate (r) 
n p b Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch
0.01 3.66 60.9291 511.59   1.0000 182,487.4 9,965.3 192,452.7
0.03 3.59 60.9291 517.01   1.0000 182,478.6 9,984.2 192,462.8
0.05 3.52 60.9292 522.62   1.0000 182,469.7 10,002.9 192,472.6
0.08 3.41 60.9293 531.40   1.0000 182,451.4 10,035.2 192,486.6
0.10 3.34 60.9293 537.52   1.0000 182,441.9 10,053.6 192495.5
0.15 3.16 60.9295 553.84   1.0000 182,414.9 10,101.0 192515.9
0.20 2.98 60.9296 571.83   1.0000 182,381.3 10,152.0 192533.3
n p b Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch n p b Q k ∏ch
0.01 2.82 61.26541 414.35 1.0000 96,786.76  95,613.9 192,400.7 N/A N/A
0.03 2.76 61.26541 422.89 1.0000 96,803.45  95,591.6 192,395.1 5.76 52.6832 340.14 1.0000 198,807.2 3.33 3.30
0.05 2.71 61.26541 431.80 1.0000 96,819.15  95,570.2 192,389.3 5.66 52.6844 345.34 1.0000 198,789.1 3.33 3.29
0.08 2.62 61.26541 445.88 1.0000 96,840.61  95,539.5 192,380.1 5.52 52.6863 353.47 1.0000 198,760.7 3.32 3.27
0.10 2.56 61.26541 455.78 1.0000 96,853.41  95,520.2 192,373.6 5.42 52.6876 359.11 1.0000 198,740.8 3.31 3.25
0.15 2.42 61.26541 482.60 1.0000 96,879.66  95,476.3 192,356.0 5.17 52.6911 374.11 1.0000 198,687.5 3.29 3.22
0.20 2.28 61.26541 512.76 1.0000 96,896.34  95,440.0 192,336.3 4.93 52.6949 390.52 1.0000 198,628.4 3.27 3.18
Joint Coordination Model
PIRet.Joint (%) PISup.Joint (%)
r
Supplier Driven Model
r
Retailer Driven Model
Locally Infeasible
124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.7 Sensitivity Analysis for the external procurement price (p0) 
n p b Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch
15.00 3.51 60.92919 521.30   0.8427   179,524.5 13,333.3 192,857.8
20.00 3.51 60.92919 521.65   0.8817   180,128.8 12,538.4 192,667.2
25.00 3.51 60.92919 522.07   0.9311   181,027.2 11,503.4 192,530.6
30.00 3.52 60.92919 522.59   0.9962   182,386.4 10,086.4 192,472.8
40.00 3.52 60.92919 522.62   1.0000   182,469.7 10,002.9 192,472.6
48.00 3.52 60.92919 522.62   1.0000   182,469.7 10,002.9 192,472.6
55.00 3.52 60.92919 522.62   1.0000   182,469.7 10,002.9 192,472.6
60.00 3.52 60.92919 522.62   1.0000   182,469.7 10,002.9 192,472.6
n p b Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch n p b Q k ∏ch
15.00 2.70 61.26562 431.54   0.8445   93,769.21  98,994.1 192,763.3 5.65 52.6849 344.79 0.8129 199,428.3 3.41 3.46
20.00 2.70 61.26552 431.65   0.8834   94,531.78  98,045.4 192,577.2 5.65 52.6848 345.07 0.8564 199,116.8 3.35 3.40
25.00 2.70 61.26545 431.75   0.9326   95,498.07  96,946.3 192,444.4 5.65 52.6846 345.29 0.9148 198,887.0 3.30 3.35
30.00 2.71 61.26541 431.80   0.9974   96,768.48  95,620.9 192,389.4 5.66 52.6844 345.34 0.9982 198,789.1 3.28 3.33
40.00 2.71 61.26541 431.80   1.0000   96,819.15  95,570.2 192,389.3 5.66 52.6844 345.34 1.0000 198,789.1 3.28 3.33
48.00 2.71 61.26541 431.80   1.0000   96,819.15  95,570.2 192,389.3 5.66 52.6844 345.34 1.0000 198,789.1 3.28 3.33
55.00 2.71 61.26541 431.80   1.0000   96,819.15  95,570.2 192,389.3 5.66 52.6844 222.17 1.0000 198,789.1 3.28 3.33
60.00 2.71 61.26541 431.80   1.0000 96,819.15  95,570.2 192,389.3 5.66 52.6844 222.17 1.0000 198,789.1 3.28 3.33
po
Retailer Driven Model Joint Coordination Model
PISup.Joint (%) PIRet.Joint (%)
po
Supplier Driven Model
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Table 5.8. Sensitivity analysis for the ratio of supplier’s setup cost to retailer’s ordering cost cv/cb,  
n p b Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch
5.00 4.39 60.9286 657.06   1.0000 183,021.0 8,054.2 191,075.2
10.00 5.01 60.9282 866.47   1.0000 183,635.4 5,291.2 188,926.6
20.00 5.39 60.9282 1,178.90 1.0000 184,312.4 1,423.3 185,735.7
30.00 3.54 60.9283 1,803.97 1.0000 182,517.6 332.6 182,850.2
40.00 2.57 60.9285 2,477.75 1.0000 180,497.0 -755.3 179,741.7
50.00 1.99 60.9286 3,200.65 1.0000 178,386.8 -1,959.7 176,427.1
n p b Q k ∏b ∏v ∏ch n p b Q k ∏ch
5.00 3.83 61.26541 431.80 1.0000 96,819.15 94,676.4 191,495.5 7.73 52.71658 331.70 1.0000 198,124.7 3.69 3.46
10.00 5.41 61.26541 431.80 1.0000 96,819.15 93,412.3 190,231.4 10.65 52.75914 318.80 1.0000 197,160.3 4.36 3.64
20.00 7.66 61.26541 431.80 1.0000 96,819.15 91,624.6 188,443.7 14.82 52.81398 306.50 1.0000 195,767.8 5.40 3.89
30.00 9.38 61.26541 431.80 1.0000 96,819.15 90,252.8 187,071.9 18.08 52.8524 299.36 1.0000 194,684.9 6.47 4.07
40.00 10.84 61.26541 431.80 1.0000 96,819.15 89,096.4 185,915.5 20.87 52.88265 294.19 1.0000 193,764.8 7.80 4.22
50.00 12.11 61.26541 431.80 1.0000 96,819.15 88,077.6 184,896.7 10.65 52.75914 318.80 1.0000 197,160.3 11.75 6.63
PIRet.Joint (%)
c v /c b
Supplier Driven Model
c v /c b
Retailer Driven Model Joint Coordination Model
PISup.Joint (%)
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
6.1 Summary and Conclusion 
This research developed several analytical models for typical supply chain situations to 
help inventory decision-makers who need mathematical models to grasp the big picture 
of supply chain inventory problems before making executive decisions. Additionally, 
we derived closed form solutions for each model and found several managerial insights 
from our models through sensitivity analysis of numerical examples. 
In Chapter 3, we present two forms of cost-profit model under individual 
decision model and coordinated policy in a two-stage supply chain when a supplier 
faces capacity shortage and has an option for emergency procurement to meet the 
market demand. We propose a supply chain coordination model that under the 
coordinated policy with outsourcing, the retailer and the supplier can determine the 
optimal ratio of outsourcing to an external supplier with consideration of all the cost 
factors, the quality levels of both supplier and external supplier, and external 
procurement price. We derive the optimal conditions when the supplier may go for an 
127 
 
emergency supply to maximize the total channel profit for a specific outsourcing price 
in both deterministic and stochastic environments.  
The results of our analysis show that the profit of the whole supply chain system 
under the coordinated policy is much larger than that under the individual decision 
model. Our numerical example also show that under the coordinated decision making 
policy, the entire supply chain benefits by outsourcing for a certain range of the 
outsource price and the acceptable level of the product quality. Our investigations are 
highlighted below: 
• formulation of a two-stage supply chain coordination model under quality uncertainty 
and shortage, which maximize the total profit of the supply chain, 
• determination of the optimal ratio of external procurement under shortage with 
considerations of product quality risk in a supply chain coordination model. 
 
In Chapter 4, we present an integrated production-inventory-marketing model for a two-
stage supply chain is presented. It is assumed the demand rate is an iso-elastic function of 
the selling price. Then, the total cost functions are developed, and the optimal values of the 
selling price, order quantity and number of shipments are obtained under independent and 
joint optimizations. A numerical example and the sensitivity analysis are done, and the 
main following findings are attained. 
 
The optimal selling price under independent optimization is higher than its value under 
joint optimization, and so coordination increases the demand- and profit of the supply 
chain. Furthermore, supply chain’s members can get more profits from coordination in a 
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competitive market in which sensitivity of the demand to price is high. Another finding is 
that increasing the unit purchasing price, which is paid by the retailer to the supplier leads 
to increase in the percentage improvement. Finally, coordination of the supply chain is less 
attractive when the supplier’s setup cost is considerably higher than the retailer’s ordering 
cost. Future research can be done for multi-suppliers and multi-retailers supply chains. In 
addition, the model can be developed for imperfect products and also deteriorating items. 
Some future research topics may be of interest here. One is to apply multi-supplier policy 
when considering bounded selling price. An investigation into the sensitivity of different 
inventory policies for a coordinated supply chain, and an analysis of the lead-time effects 
and batches of different sizes are two other subjects in the works. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 5 we sought to provide implementable contractual arrangements to 
coordinate the channel with the consideration of supply uncertainty. We first develop a 
general framework that incorporates supply uncertainty. Based on the general framework, 
we further develop supply contracts under conditions of supply uncertainty and 
deterministic demand with an infinite planning horizon.  
The findings reported clearly show that ignoring incentive conflicts and supply 
information issues can lead to undesirable behavior. We proposed a model for how lot size, 
quality level, and transactions should be structured to help reduce supply chain inefficiency 
due to individual incentives and private information. We examined the impact of both 
supply and demand uncertainty on channel performance and proposed a consignment 
contract to help coordinate the channel. The problems investigated in this chapter are 
summarized below: 
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• a general framework of supply chain contract design under supply uncertainty, 
• the design of optimal cost-sharing contracts under supply uncertainty and continuous 
deterministic demand, 
• an exploration of the value of supply uncertainty information. 
 
6.2 Managerial Insights 
In this section, we will discuss the potential managerial implications of our findings, and 
explicitly address the management decisions that may be affected by using the insights for 
the industrial practice from our studies. 
 We believe that our models and the insights that we obtained from the three 
research projects are helpful for applications and implementations in real-life. In this 
dissertation, the emphasis has been on understanding the implications of supply chain 
coordination and competition on supply chain operations planning. More specifically, we 
focused on operational decision making in a supply chain with limited inventory capacity 
and allowed stockout under price and quality competition. We provided insights from  
literature survey, analytical models, and sensitivity analysis to better understand the 
performance consequences of the supply chains and to find effective ways of improving it. 
In practice, many other issues also play a role such as the negotiation power between the 
external supplier and the supplier. However, we believe that the results and insights that 
we obtained in the various research studies of this dissertation can contribute to solving the 
broader real-life problems related to the planning and control of outsourced supply chains.  
 Strategic outsourcing decisions in the literature have been mainly motivated by the 
transaction cost theory, resource based view theory, and the focus on core competences. 
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Based on our research, in which we have shown some operational implications of 
outsourcing under quality uncertainty, we believe that one should also consider these 
issues when taking the strategic outsourcing decision. Consideration of the operational 
implications of outsourcing when taking the strategic outsourcing decision will lead to a 
different and better estimate of the transaction costs and probably to a different strategic 
outsourcing decision. 
 Our research also contributes to management practitioners by providing some 
managerial implications of supply chain competition and coordination with emergency 
supply option under shortage. Even though the insufficient production capacity of a 
supplier may result in lost sales, the supplier can make an optimal decision from the 
standpoint of a supply chain optimization, rather than a marketing perspective. As the 
supplier coordinates with other participants in a supply chain and procures the items from 
external sources, the total net profit of the entire supply chain may be improved by external 
procurement. The demand of the retailer follows a stochastic distribution and is assumed to 
be a normal distribution in the numerical example. However, in practice, the demand of the 
retailer in the supply chain system may abide by an irregular movement. So, we shall 
consider that the complex relationship between cost and profit under that demand and 
order cost might follow other distributions in the future. 
 For the supply chain coordination models under quality uncertainty in Chapter 3, 
we distinguish our work from theirs and contribute to this literature on two main 
dimensions. First, we deliver the optimal ratio of external procurement for capacity 
shortage in a two-stage supply chain in a deterministic environment. Second, we explicitly 
dealt with uncertain supply conditions with imperfect quality and its dynamic interplay 
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with outsourcing decisions. In other words, we specifically investigate how changes in the 
quality of product may affect capacity and outsourcing decisions. 
This research also gave decision-makers insights into how to implement the 
situation of demand uncertainty and shortage into a mathematical model in a two-stage 
supply chain and showed them what differences these proposed analytical models make as 
opposed to the traditional models. Even though each analytical model is simple but each 
provided an effective overall view of the supply chain system by abstracting the features of 
a supply chain system as a set of parameterized functions. We implemented time-sensitive 
shortages into an inventory model under emergency replenishment. 
 This research has roots in applied probability, optimization, inventory theory, game 
theory, and economics. We develop optimization models aimed at minimizing 
entity/system costs or maximizing entity/system profits for the purpose of supply chain 
coordination and optimal contract design. Our focus is to formulate more realistic demand 
functions including price and quality factors. From the methodology perspective, our 
optimization models are all stochastic modeling problems that require 
unconstrained/constrained dynamic or nonlinear optimization techniques, depending on the 
factors considered. 
 
6.3 Future Directions 
This dissertation investigates supply chain coordination models under quality uncertainty 
and supply chain competition models through contracts. To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no previous work on supply chain coordination and competition models with 
quality uncertainty considerations. Our work seeks to fill this gap.  
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 First, the supply chain we consider in this work consists of a single retailer and a 
single supplier. A direct extension of this study is to look into a network of suppliers and 
understand the design of external quality cost sharing contracts for product failure such as 
recalls with multiple suppliers. 
 Second, the mechanisms for coordination need to be studied in detail. The 
coordination mechanisms can further be of different sub-types. To coordinate the whole 
supply chain, the aggregation of the impact of all coordination mechanisms on the 
performance of supply chain is required. Various combinations may be explored to achieve 
much higher business goals with the help of simulation. 
 Third, supply chain contracts have proved to coordinate single period supply 
chains. Research is required to explore the utility of contracts in multi-period cases. In 
multi-period models, the supply chain members are more exposed to the uncertainty as 
they are dealing with supply chain members frequently under uncertainty issues. How 
various coordination mechanisms can be allied in multi-period problems as well as how we 
can evaluate a coordination mechanism in such case would be potentially good research 
questions. 
 Fourth, quality incentive, reward, or compensation programs have long been 
employed for the purpose of quality control in numerous industries. We may design a 
quality-compensation contract as an incentive scheme for supply chain coordination in the 
future. For example, electronic appliances, automobile manufacturers compensate their 
retailers or dealers for the quality failure of their products using a warranty program 
(Smith, 1997; Balachandran and Radhakrishnan, 2005). Prior studies on quality 
compensation advocate that the supplier and resellers can achieve higher efficiency by 
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sharing quality failure costs in the entire supply chain (Reyniersand Tapiero, 1995; Baiman 
et al., 2000; Baiman et al., 2001; Balachandran and Radhakrishnan, 2005). We show that a 
manufacturer not only raises its efficiency with quality compensation granted to the 
retailer, but also fully coordinates the supply chain by carefully choosing the amount of the 
compensation and designing quality-compensation structure for supply chain coordination. 
 Finally, very few studies quantify risk or uncertainty in supply chains. The 
Bullwhip effect has extensively been discussed on the demand side in the literature. 
Actually, there can be many variations seen in supply chain like supply uncertainty, delay 
in delivery having cascading effect as we go downwards in the supply chain or network, 
which is similar to the order variation in Bullwhip effect. We think how a supply chain can 
help in mitigating such uncertainties is one of the important research issues in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
A. Sufficient conditions for a local maximum in the objective functions in Ch. 3 
Deterministic model and Ch. 4 Price dependent demand model. 
 
For the deterministic demand model in chapter 3, it is sufficient to show that the objective 
function ( , , )ch n Q k  is concave for n, Q, k >0. The Hessian matrix is given as follows: 
 
H (n, Q, k ) = 
{{−
2𝑏𝑑𝐷
𝑛3𝑄
,−
1
2
hv(1 −
𝐷
𝑃
) −
𝑏𝑑𝐷
𝑛2𝑄2
, 0}, 
{−
1
2
hv (1 −
𝐷
𝑃
) −
𝑏𝑑𝐷
𝑛2𝑄2
, −
2𝑏𝑑𝐷
𝑛𝑄3
−
2𝑐𝐷(𝑏 + (1 − 𝑏)𝑘)
𝑄3(1 − 𝑟)
,
(1 − 𝑏)𝑐𝐷
𝑄2(1 − 𝑟)
}, 
{0,
(1 − 𝑏)𝑐𝐷
𝑄2(1 − 𝑟)
, −2(1 − 𝑏)𝐷g0}} 
We see H11 < 0,  and  Det (H) with  the system parameters used in the examples, we 
obtain the determinant of the Hessian matrix numerically as follows  : 
Det[{{−
320. 𝐷
𝑛3𝑄
,−
5
6
−
160. 𝐷
𝑛2𝑄2
, 0}, 
{−
5
6
−
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, −
1684210.52(0.8  + 0.8𝑘)
𝑄3
−
320. 𝐷
𝑛𝑄3
,
673684.21
𝑄2
}, 
{0,
673684.21
𝑄2
, −1.99𝐷}}] 
151 
 
1
𝑛4𝑄5
𝐷(−153599.97𝐷2𝑄 + 533.33𝐷𝑛2𝑄3 + 1.38𝑛4𝑄5
+ 𝑛(1.45 × 1014 + 𝐷(−8.62 × 108 − 8.62 × 108𝑘)𝑄)) < 0 
Since the all the members of the principal diagonal of the Hessian matrix are negative or 
zero, we conclude that the objective function is a concave function and has a local 
maximum. 
 
In the same way we did above, for the price dependent demand model in chapter 4, it is 
sufficient to show that the objective function ( , , , )ch bn p Q k  is concave for 
, , , 0bn p Q k  n, Q, k >0. The Hessian matrix is given as follows: 
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We find H11 < 0,  and  Det (H) with  the system parameters used in the examples, we obtain the determinant of the Hessian matrix 
numerically as follows  :  
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−
5.875 × 108𝑄
𝑝3.35𝑃
, 0}, 
{−
5
2
(1 −
100000000
𝑝2.35𝑃
) −
20000000000𝑏
𝑛2𝑝2.35𝑄2
, −
1.684210526315789 × 1010
𝑝2.35𝑄3
−
40000000000𝑏
𝑛𝑝2.35𝑄3
,
5.875 × 108(2 − 𝑛)
𝑝3.35𝑃
−
1.978947368421052 × 1010
𝑝3.35𝑄2
−
4.7 × 1010𝑏
𝑛𝑝3.35𝑄2
, 0}, 
{−
4.7 × 1010𝑏
𝑛2𝑝3.35𝑄
−
5.875 × 108𝑄
𝑝3.35𝑃
,
5.875 × 108(2 − 𝑛)
𝑝3.35𝑃
−
1.978947368421052 × 1010
𝑝3.35𝑄2
−
4.7 × 1010𝑏
𝑛𝑝3.35𝑄2
,
3.1725 × 108
𝑝3.35
−
7.8725 × 108𝑞
𝑝4.35
−
6.629473684210526 × 1010
𝑝4.35𝑄
−
1.5745 × 1011𝑏
𝑛𝑝4.35𝑄
−
1.968125 × 109(2 − 𝑛)𝑄
𝑝4.35𝑃
, 0}, 
{0,0,0,0}} 
Finally, we find Det (H) = 0 running mathematica. We conclude that the Hessian matrix of this stationary point is negative 
definite and the stationary point is a local maximum.  
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B. Optimal solution, *
bp  of the supplier driven model 
*
bp    
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C. Mathematical Programming Codes (Maple/Matlab/LINGO) 
CH 3. LINGO CODES for Nonlinear Optimization 
 
 
!Model 0 - General Model (OLD); 
!Max = (0.8*10000*45)+(0.2*10000*K*45)-
((0.8*10000+0.2*10000*K)*80)/(Q*(1-0.05))-(Q*6*(1-0.05))/2-
0.8*10000*30-(0.8*10000*200)/(N*Q)-((Q*5)/2)*((2-N)*(10000/15000)+(N-
1))-(1-0.8)*10000*K*48-(1-0.8)*10000*(1-K)*(5-3*K); 
 
!General Model with parameters v2 (BEST ORIGINAL);  
Max = (b*10000*45)+((1-b)*10000*K*45)-((b*10000+(1-
b)*10000*K)*80)/(Q*(1-r))-(Q*6*(1-r))/2-b*10000*30-
(b*10000*200)/(N*Q)-((Q*5)/2)*((2-N)*(10000/15000)+(N-1))-(1-
b)*10000*K*U-(1-b)*10000*(1-K)*(5-3*K); 
 
!b=beta; 
b = 1-r*(1-K); 
r = 0.05; 
!N=3; 
U = 48; 
D = 10000; 
 
 
 
!QR= Retailer Driven Model; 
!Q = (1/(1-r))*@SQRT((2*80*10000*(b+K*(1-b))/6)); 
!Q = (1/(1-r))*@SQRT((2*80*D*(b+K*(1-b))/6)); 
 
!QS= Supplier Driven Model; 
!Q =(@SQRT((2*b*10000*200)/(5*((2-N)*(10000/15000)+(N-1))))); 
!Q =(@SQRT((2*b*D*200)/(5*((2-N)*(D/15000)+(N-1))))); 
 
!QJ= Joint Coordination Model; 
!Q = (@SQRT((2*(N*80*10000*(b+K*(1-b))+b*10000*200))/((1-r)*N*((1-
0.05)*(6+5*((2-N)*(10000/15000)+(N-1))))))); 
Q = (@SQRT((2*(N*80*D*(b+K*(1-b))+b*D*200*(1-r)))/((1-r)*N*((6*(1-
0.05)+5*((2-N)*(D/15000)+(N-1))))))); 
 
K >= 0; 
K <= 1; 
Q > 0; 
N*Q <= 10000; 
!N = 3; 
N >= 1; 
!K = 0; 
!K = 1; 
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CH 4. LINGO CODES for Nonlinear Optimization 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 CODES 
 
 
 
!Model 0 - General Model (OLD); 
!Max = (0.8*10000*45)+(0.2*10000*K*45)-
((0.8*10000+0.2*10000*K)*80)/(Q*(1-0.05))-(Q*6*(1-0.05))/2-
0.8*10000*30-(0.8*10000*200)/(N*Q)-((Q*5)/2)*((2-N)*(10000/15000)+(N-
1))-(1-0.8)*10000*K*48-(1-0.8)*10000*(1-K)*(5-3*K); 
 
 
!General Model with parameters v2 (BEST ORIGINAL);  
!Max = (b*10000*45)+((1-b)*10000*K*45)-((b*10000+(1-
b)*10000*K)*80)/(Q*(1-r))-(Q*6*(1-r))/2-b*10000*30-
(b*10000*200)/(N*Q)-((Q*5)/2)*((2-N)*(10000/15000)+(N-1))-(1-
b)*10000*K*U-(1-b)*10000*(1-K)*(5-3*K); 
 
 
!chapter 4. price dependent model; 
Max = (b*D*p)+((1-b)*D*K*p)-((b*D+(1-b)*D*K)*80)/(Q*(1-r))-(Q*6*(1-
r))/2-b*D*30-(b*D*200)/(N*Q)-((Q*5)/2)*((2-N)*(D/10000)+(N-1)) 
-(1-b)*D*K*U-(1-b)*D*(1-K)*(5-3*K); 
!b=beta; 
!b = 0.8; 
b=1-r*(1-K); 
r = 0.05; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!; 
!Retailers OPT conditions; 
!N = 5; 
!p = 63.2964; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!; 
!Suppliers OPT conditions; 
!N = 8; 
!p = 63.0033; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!; 
!Joint Coordination OPT conditions; 
!N = 45; 
!p = 54.3473; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!; 
U = 48; 
!U = 50; 
D = a*(p)^(-c); 
! Indvidual/Suppliers/Retailers/ Model; 
a = 100000000; 
!p = 49.5913; 
!p = 53.29; 
c = 2.35;  
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!c = 1.60;  !K = 0 
!c = 1.55;  !K = 0 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!; 
! retailer's p; 
!p = ; 
!(b+K*(1-b))*a*(p)^(-c)-(b+K*(1-b))*a*(c)*((p)^(-c-1))*(p-35)-(b+K*(1-
b))*(a*(-c)*(p)^(-c-1)*(80)*(6))/(@sqrt((b+K*(1-b))*2*a*((p)^(-
c))*(80)*(6)))=0; 
 
! Supplier's p; 
(b+K*(1-b))*a*((p)^(-c))-(b+K*(1-b))*a*(c)*((p)^(-c-1))*(p-
35)+(c+0.5)*((p)^(-c-1.5))*(b+K*(1-b))*(@sqrt(a*5)*80*(((5)*((2-
N)*(w)+(N-1)))+6))/(@sqrt(2*200)*(1-r))+(c+0.5)*((p)^(-c-1.5))*(6*(1-
r)*@sqrt(2*a*200))/(2*@sqrt((((5)*((2-N)*(w)+(N-1)))+6)))=0; 
!p = ; 
 
! Joint Model's p 
!p = ; 
!(b+K*(1-b))*a*((p)^(-c))-(b+K*(1-b))*a*(c)*((p)^(-c-1))*(p-30)-
(b+K*(1-b))*(a*(-c)*(p)^(-c-1)*((200/N)+80)*(((5)*((2-N)*(w)+(N-
1)))+6))/(@sqrt((b+K*(1-b))*2*a*((p)^(-c))*((200/N)+80)*((5)*((2-
N)*(w)+(N-1))+6)))=0; 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!; 
 
 
!Joint Coordination Model; 
!a = 2000000; 
!p = 69.31; 
!c = 1.25; 
 
!retail price; 
!w = D/P; 
w = 1; 
!Demand = a*exp(-C);  
!a - scale factor; 
!b - price elasticity; 
K >= 0; 
K <= 1; 
Q > 0; 
!N*Q <= a*((p)^(-c)); 
!N*Q <= 10000; 
!N = 3; 
!N = 4; 
!N = 5; 
!N = 6; 
!N = 7; 
!N = 8; 
!N = 9; 
!N = 10; 
 
N >= 1; 
!K = 0; 
!K = 1; 
 
!Demand=a*(pb)^(-c); 
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!retail price pb1 (Ind, Retailer, Supplier are same); 
!retail price pb2 (joint Coordination Model); 
 
!QR= Retailer Driven Model; 
!Q = (1/(1-r))*@SQRT((2*80*10000*(b+K*(1-b))/6)); 
!Q = (1/(1-r))*@SQRT((2*80*D*(b+K*(1-b))/6)); 
 
!QS= Supplier Driven Model; 
!Q =(@SQRT((2*b*10000*200)/(5*((2-N)*(10000/15000)+(N-1))))); 
Q =(@SQRT((2*b*D*200)/(5*((2-N)*(D/15000)+(N-1))))); 
 
!QJ= Joint Coordination Model; 
!Q = (@SQRT((2*(N*80*10000*(b+K*(1-b))+b*10000*200))/((1-r)*N*((1-
0.05)*(6+5*((2-N)*(10000/15000)+(N-1))))))); 
!Q = (@SQRT((2*(N*80*D*(b+K*(1-b))+b*D*200*(1-r)))/((1-r)*N*((6*(1-
0.05)+5*((2-N)*(D/15000)+(N-1))))))); 
 
 
N*Q <= a*((p)^(-c)); 
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